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WHAT is the precise meaning of the substitution of Dr. Michaelis for von Bethmann-Hollweg as Chancellor of the German Empire remains obscure at this writing; but we are apparently safe in appraising it as an attempt to evade the real dilemma rather than as an attempt to meet it. The real dilemma of the German government arises from the increasing indisposition of the German people to fight on for anything but a purely defensive object, and in order to make the German cause purely defensive the majority of the Reichstag wishes to accept the Russian peace formula. The former Chancellor refused to commit the government to a program either of annexations or of their renunciation, but he was sympathetic with the ideas of the majority of the Reichstag. He has apparently been succeeded by a man who also will refuse either to propose annexations or definitely to renounce them, but who is sympathetic with the Junkers. Yet although Dr. Michaelis represents the military party rather than their opponents, he has not been appointed merely to perform the impossible task of securing for Germany the fruits of victory without being able to win the victory itself. He has been appointed to gain more time in the hope of a substantial improvement during the next few months in the military or political position of Germany.

IF the new Chancellor is betting on an improvement in the military and political position of Germany, he is not likely to be satisfied with a merely passive policy of waiting and hoping. In all probability the German High Command is planning to make one final and desperate effort to put an end to the armed resistance of one of its major enemies. During the next few weeks an attack will probably be launched against some part of the line, and unless we are very much mistaken it will not be launched against either France or Italy. The Germans are likely to strike on the Galician and Rumanian front with the intention of reaching Odessa, occupying some of the rich agricultural regions in the south of Russia, of capturing additional food supplies, and of possibly increasing Russian disorganization. An advance in this direction would meet with less resistance than one further north, would occupy territory more easily held, and would do most to alleviate the shortage in food. Of course this is only a guess. The General Staff may not have the man and munition power to hold in the west and attack in the southeast. But if they are unable to risk a major offensive one result is certain. The German government must, in that case, soon accept the Russian peace formula. A purely defensive program cannot be avoided unless the military party can renew the hope of victory by a powerful, dramatic and serviceable blow against its encircling wall of enemies.

NOW that Bethmann-Hollweg is down and out some of the German papers are kicking him. This is natural and unfair. Natural, because he did not succeed in keeping the United States out of the war. Unfair, because no mortal chancellor could have succeeded. Nobody knows how many Germans still believe the war can end in a German

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peace. Everybody knows that but for the submarines such believers would be so few you could stow them into a couple of zeppelins. But for the submarines the United States might have postponed until the war was over the discovery that victory for Germany meant an evil future for the world. Bethmann-Hollweg knew this. He knew, too, that the submarines were not certain to win the war for Germany. But he also knew their activity was needed to keep German hopes alive. Any German Chancellor, face to face with these facts, was bound to decide to let the navy see what could be done by submarine ruthlessness. Bethmann-Hollweg, anxious to keep the United States out as long as he could, tried to deceive our government by methods certain to be exposed. That was a mistake, yet he had some excuse for it. Long after the war began the United States still looked, to most outsiders and to many insiders, like a nation that might remain too proud to help make the world safe for democracy.

FINLAND and the Ukraine are playing politics in a manner that must be very encouraging to Germany. If Russia could be split into a large number of national states, with or without a loose and unworkable federal organization, Germany would have little to fear from active military operations on the eastern front. Moreover, peace, when it comes, would offer the Germans a magnificent opportunity for peaceful penetration. No matter how the boundaries of the autonomous Russian nationalities might be drawn, they would present frequent occasion for interstate friction. The nationalities in Russia are even more inextricably intermingled than in the Balkans, and the world will not soon forget how the friction of Balkan nationalities has been utilized by Germany. Russia presents the additional problem of a vast unexploited domain, Siberia, to which hosts of emigrants from all over Russia are flowing. What do the Ukrainians propose to do with the two millions and more of their nationals now settled in Siberia? Leave them to be denationalized by the Great Russians who seem destined to control Siberian development?

HOWEVER unfortunate, from an international point of view, the presentation of nationalistic demands at this time, it is not wholly without excuse. The Finns can not look back upon Russian liberalism under the Czar as a force opposed to their Russification. Nor was liberalism especially friendly toward Ukrainian aspirations. In spite of the hostility of the Russian liberals to German influence, they had accepted so much of German imperialistic philosophy as bears upon the advantages of linguistic and cultural homogeneity throughout a political domain. Many men whose support is now given to the Provisional Government looked with complacency upon the forcible Russification practised in the later years of the old régime. The nationalistic groups fear that this spirit of Russification may revive after the war, and are seizing upon the occasion of governmental chaos to establish their claims. They are demanding too much; just as the Russian proletariat is demanding too much. It does not follow that they will not readily yield to a compromise that will conserve the essentials of Russian power while making better provision for freedom and toleration than could possibly have been attained if the Provisional Government had been left to work out its own devices.

THE Russian offensive, which apparently has come to an end, has been useful not so much for its military or moral as for its political value. It has strengthened the strategic position in international policies of the peace program of the Russian government, and that program in spite of its manifest limitations is acting as a peculiarly powerful leavening force on the political purposes of all the belligerent nations. It has captured Austria-Hungary, weakened Germany and is persuading Italy, France and Great Britain to revise the dubious aspects of their agreements. It is forcing all the belligerents to place less emphasis on victory and more upon the object for which victory is to be used. The Russians, consequently, are literally waging a kind of war which tends to end war. In discarding the aggressive ambitions which autocratic Russia sought to realize by means of war, they have also discarded the old war-cries and the old blind fighting spirit. They decline to accept the alternative which President Wilson proposed to the American people of either conquering or submitting. They have renounced conquering. They attach no importance to military victory as such. Yet they absolutely refuse to submit. They will fight as long as it is necessary to resist aggression. They will not fight either to promote the aggressive purposes of other nations or to win a victory over an enemy who can be induced really to renounce aggression. More power to their arms.

IN renominating Mayor Mitchel as its candidate in the coming New York municipal election the Fusion Committee has adopted the one course which is most likely to contribute to the permanent political wellbeing of the city. If Mr. Mitchel had not been the Fusion candidate, it would have been difficult to ask the voters in a sufficiently uncompromising way whether or not they wished

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to endorse an administration of the city's business such as that of Mayor Mitchel, and that is the question upon which for its own future political welfare the electorate most needs to pass. It would be better to lose on that issue than to win as the consequence of any attempt or even any tendency to evade it, because in spite of grave and in some respects insuperable obstacles Mr. Mitchel has accomplished far more to make the government of the city serviceable in the lives of its citizens than any mayor New York has ever had. If Tammany wishes to challenge this record all good citizens should rejoice to have it challenged and to ask a verdict from the voters on it. That is the only honorable course, and it is the one most likely to be successful. But in order that it may be successful, Fusion must not allow Tammany to confuse the issue by placing Mr. Mitchel in the position of opposing municipal ownership of public utilities. Such is evidently the plan of campaign of Mr. Mitchel's opponents, and there is just one way of effectively neutralizing it. The Fusion Committee must itself come out for a program of municipalization as broad as that of Tammany.

CONGRESS refused to authorize a censorship of the press. Nevertheless there is an obscure section in the Espionage bill under which the Post Office Department has assumed wide discretion in excluding from the mails matter which may discourage recruiting. As a result, fourteen Socialist and radical publications, American in origin and printed in English, have been denied the mailing privilege. In some cases the editors remained in ignorance of the exclusion until they discovered it by accident. In many cases the editors were unable to discover what the offending matter was, the postmasters replying that the "spirit" or "tone" of the publication was objectionable. The effect is to terrorize all criticism and make it next to impossible for the editor to insure that future issues may be mailable. In some cases the local officials used their power as a threat, not only to keep out matter of which they disapproved, but to keep out matter showing how the publication had been censored. In no case is there any provision for the publisher to state his defense except by costly legal proceedings. Here we have an irresponsible censorship, executed by local officials who may be thoroughly unfit for the task, under a clause interpreted so broadly that it would enable an unfit or prejudiced postmaster to hold up a paper containing almost any war story or political opposition to the government. Whatever we may think of the papers in question, we must condemn the stupidity of such procedure. If we are to have a censorship, let it be centralized in competent hands, let it be exercised openly under strict limitations, and let the way be cleared for appeal. If we are not to have a censorship, let us not intensify distrust of the government and its purposes by such petty and ineffectual tyranny.

THE Agamemnon-Achilles episode in our shipbuilding enterprise has run about as long as the American people will stand. We have been at war for five months, and from the very first day of our belligerency, everyone who gave the least attention to the practical conditions under which we must fight has been clear in his mind that our most pressing need is ships. In these five months we should have been applying all the energy available for the purpose to ship construction. Much has indeed been done, but not nearly all that could have been done if Messrs. Denman and Goethals had been willing to table their private disagreements and push forward so much of the program as they could both approve. On the matter of accelerating construction of ships already on the ways there should have been no quarrel. Whether such ships should become the property of the United States or not might later be determined. Nor should there have been any quarrel about laying down the maximum amount of steel construction that can be launched in eighteen months. The question of prices to be paid for steel could have been subsequently adjudicated. There was no valid ground for disagreement over the laying down of the greatest possible number of Ferris design wooden ships. Everybody considers this a good ship. This would narrow the controversy to the ship of the Hough design, and the question ought to be submitted for final decision neither to a lawyer nor to a civil engineer nor to an author of a competing design, but to an impartial board of naval architects and construction men not interested in steel or lumber, nor interested in the prosperity of Atlantic or Gulf or Pacific ship yards, but in the honor and welfare of the American people.

SENATOR REED of Missouri is making a nuisance of himself in the Senate. He is doing this thoroughly, over and over, because he is made that way. As a nuisance his specialty is rough stuff. His rough stuff is a peculiar blend of the silly and the mean. Is there a foolish prejudice, here and there about the country, against Americans who have lived abroad? "I need that prejudice in my business," Mr. Reed seems to say to himself, and off he goes railing at Mr. Hoover, accusing him of having spent years of his life outside the United States, of having been active in France, China, South America, England, of owning a house in Kensington. Can Mr. Reed turn a few

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thousand imbeciles against Mr. Hoover by this line of talk? Perhaps. Mr. Reed seems to prefer the approval of the stupidest people he can find. Is there a strong, popular feeling against gamblers in food? "Why not call Hoover a food gambler?" Mr. Reed seems to ask, and goes and does it. No other Senator is just at this moment making such a sorry show of himself on such a large scale. Others may mean more harm, and do it quietly in committee rooms, but Mr. Reed is doing his dirty work in public, and the public is paying him for doing it.

The Moral Attrition of Germany

AMERICANS should not underestimate the meaning and promise of the current political dissensions in Germany. They may not, as the State Department has said, do anything to make the immediate task of the Allied armies any less costly and difficult. They have not reached a stage which permits the Allies for one moment to relax the intensity of the economic and military pressure which they are exerting on the people of Central Europe. On the contrary these dissensions would probably diminish if the rigor of blockade were relaxed or if the German government had any chance of negotiating with Russia a separate peace. Nevertheless they are of immense importance. They constitute an implicit confession of the moral infirmity of German political strategy before and during the war. The German government has been depending on a lie in order to keep the German people united in its support. The prevailing dissensions indicate that the lie has finally come home to roost. The full meaning of the discovery has not yet dawned on the German national consciousness, but when it does, the consequences may be salutary for the future both of Germany and the world. What we are witnessing now is the preliminary sign and necessary condition of that greater victory which can accrue only through the virtual admission by the German people of failure and of a relation between their failure and their deserts.

The German government has been lying because, as we pointed out last week, it has been playing its game in two contradictory ways. It has been trying to reap the benefit of both an offensive and a defensive strategy, of a psychology both of victorious conquest and of honorable resistance to aggression. In order to secure popular support it has sounded first one note and then the other; but it has depended, nevertheless, more upon one note than upon the other. Although much emphasis has been placed on the claim that the Germans were fighting chiefly in order to protect their own security and independence, still more emphasis has been placed on the victorious initiative of the German armies, of their occupation of enemy territory and of the practical inviolacy of the sacred German soil. Thus the Germans have been taught to count upon the certainty of victory, and on the prospect of obtaining through victory a glorious peace—a peace which would increase their national prestige while securing them against future attack.

In order to obtain this victory the German government has launched one terrific offensive after another. The first was aimed at France through Belgium and was defeated at the Marne. The second was aimed at Great Britain and was defeated at Ypres. Next a dagger was triumphantly buried in the vast body of the Russian bear, but it failed to reach a vital spot. A second blow was then delivered against France and was parried by the superb fighting quality of the French armies. Finally, despairing of a purely military decision, the German government turned the submarine loose in the hope of isolating Great Britain and cutting her communications with her Allies and her sources of supply. It was a final demonstration of the price which victory had come to be worth to the German ruling class. They must have a military decision no matter how much they had to pay for it in unnecessary enmities and in future political isolation.

The morale of the German people in relation to the war has been based, consequently, not merely on the crying need of victory, but on the confident expectation of victory. Victory was to bring relief from present sufferings and safeguards for future security. It was a morale which must tend to disintegrate just as soon as the hopes of victory were extinguished. The existing dissensions in Germany can mean only one thing. The submarine campaign in spite of the enormous expense to which it is putting the Allied enemies of Germany will not and cannot bring the needed victory. The attrition of German military resources is proceeding at a more rapid rate than the attrition of the British naval resources. The Germans have shot every bolt in the quiver without bringing down any of their bigger enemies. Their rulers can no longer persuade the German people to suffer and fight in the expectation of victory and its fruits. The Day which dawned so radiantly in August, 1914, and which was followed by so prolonged and distressing a twilight is being closed by the gloom of a murky and starless night. The German ruling class have staked their own political reputations and that of their fellow countrymen on their ability to conquer by military weapons

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a position in Europe so preëminent that their own security would bring with it the insecurity of all their neighbors. They have failed, and during the coming year they will be chewing the sour ashes of their thwarted ambitions.

If Germany had been fighting chiefly a defensive war, the moral unity of her people would not have been impaired by the final extinction of the hope of a positive victory. The disintegration from which her national morale is now suffering is the direct and inevitable result of the essentially aggressive character of her political and military strategy. The German armies seized the offensive in the early days of the war. They occupied and held large and important slices of enemy territory and their leaders boasted of their conquests and triumphs. But they failed in their indispensable task of annihilating either French or Russian military power or British maritime control, and they soon found themselves in the anomalous situation of being both victorious and besieged. They have been sufficiently successful in beating off their besiegers, but blockaded as they are, their past aggression prevents them from seeking refuge in a purely defensive psychology and strategy. They need and crave peace as much as some of their opponents and more than others. But they are occupying conquered territory and no serious negotiations for peace can begin until their enemies are informed whether or not their proposals as to the future of the occupied territory are those of a repentant or an unrepentant aggressor. They have fastened the political initiative on themselves as an inexorable consequence of their own early offence, and by so doing they have domesticated a dilemma which is bound slowly but steadily to undermine their morale. They cannot suppress their craving for peace, yet they cannot do anything to satisfy it unless they themselves make negotiations possible by expressly renouncing the pride of victory and the reward of conquest. In order to acquire the courage to continue fighting for another year they need to substitute an essentially defensive psychology and strategy for their past psychology and strategy, which was predominantly one of victory and conquest; and this substitution, as the ruling class very well knows, will involve a radical transformation in the political mechanism and in the moral spirit of the German nation.

If as a result of uninterrupted military, economic and moral pressure, the morale of the German imperial system is finally undermined, the cause for which the Allied enemies of Germany have been fighting will receive its one perfect vindication. It can never obtain such a vindication from the decisive defeat of the German armies, because a military victory, useful as its results may be, proves nothing as to the comparative merits of the contending causes. Neither can it obtain such a vindication from the sudden and complete collapse of Germany as a consequence of a scarcity of raw materials and food, for a siege is a purely military weapon and its success is not conclusive as to the justice of the cause of the triumphant besiegers. But if the vast strength of the Allied armies and the suffocating grip of the most rigorous blockade known to history serve to test the moral stamina of the German nation rather than to overcome its resistance; and if as a result of that test significant signs of political disintegration set in, for which a morally equivocal psychology and strategy can be held directly responsible, then surely the improved strategic situation of the Allies does prove something. A victory obtained in this way would prove not that they were more overwhelmingly powerful than their enemy, but that they were more nearly right.

The competition in physical attrition is being transformed into a competition in moral attrition. At different times during the course of the war the severity of the strain has shaken the cohesion of every European nation. Both France and Great Britain have had to patch up and reconstruct political and economic organizations which immediately developed flagrant weaknesses. Russia was forced to discard even at the risk of anarchy a corrupt and disloyal autocracy as well as the policy of conquest which an autocracy naturally favors. The moral fibre of these three nations, each in a different way, toughened under the test. No one of them doubted for a moment their need and their right to resist to the bitter end the unforgivable offense of Germany. Much as they have suffered and are suffering they can call to their aid the unalterable conviction that as long as German troops occupy Belgian, French and Serbian soil, as long as the German government does not satisfactorily repudiate its offensive conquests, they are fighting for the essentials of national security and safety. In their days of suffering and despair the German people are unable to stiffen their determination never to yield with the iron of such a thought. Before they can seek refuge in an essentially defensive morale they must renounce the conquests with which they are morally burdened as a consequence of their own aggression. And when they make up their minds to renounce now and hereafter the aggressive ambitions with which their leaders have tempted them, they will have admitted their own moral defeat and will have yielded a victory to their enemies which, whatever its quantity, will, in the happy phrase of Lloyd George, be unexceptionable in quality.

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The Vatican in Central Europe

THOSE who have emphasized the political bankruptcy of papalism since the outbreak of war will be compelled to revise their opinions of Vatican ability. Not, indeed, that Rome has undergone any change of heart. Not that the moral implications of this struggle have been borne in upon her in a way that was formerly unknown. To the Papal secretary of state Cardinal Mercier is as inconvenient a figure as at any period since August, 1914. But the fatal march of time is rapidly making possible some permanent disposition of success. It is already sufficiently clear that the ideals of Pan-Germanism have failed of realization; all that remains is the problem of how much can be saved from the wreckage of her dreams. Rome is the one religious organization that still maintains, in detail and in circumstance, the claims of a modern state. Her future is intimately bound up with the political disposition of Europe. It was inevitable, given her nature, that she should attempt to influence the march of events, and it is important to understand the exact purpose of her effort.

No one can miss the significant change in the attitude of the Center party in Germany and of Austria in general. In the early days of the war the German Catholics were among the extremest supporters of advanced annexationism. There was no sign that Rome—with whom, ever since the Kulturkampf, the Center has retained the closest connection—felt any difficulty in that semi-religious emphasis. The organ of the Center party, Germania, was not in any way to be distinguished from Das Tägliche Rundschau or the Berlin Lokal Anzeiger except by the fact that it was better written and better edited. But to-day the tone of party and of journal is very different. Herr Erzberger, a man upon whom Rome has often lavished signs of her especial favor, is speaking of the virtues of a peace which shall bring reconciliation and friendship to the whole of Europe. He is demanding the discontinuance of the submarine warfare. He is insisting that while the late Chancellor might be responsible for the guidance of the war, his responsibility for its onset rendered it unsuitable that he should inaugurate the era of peace. The Catholic center, in fact, from being an efficient weapon in the hands of the Junker, has become an integral part of the left wing of the Reichstag; and the editorials of Germania are to-day like a pale echo of Vorwärts.

Almost equally remarkable is the volte-face of Austria. The new emperor has been long known as an enthusiastic devotee of Rome. Much of his policy already shows signs of an unwillingness to endure the yoke of Hohenzollern control. There has been political amnesty for his antagonists. There has been talk, and serious promise, of widespread political reform. The official talk of Vienna is very notably more moderate than the kindred conversation of Berlin. We are assured that the emperor is not bound by the policy of his predecessor. We have protestations of his anxiety for a peace that shall satisfy all combatants. His foreign minister, Count Czernin, is in continuous relation with Bavaria, whose growing hostility to Berlin the enmity of the Junkers for her able prime minister almost daily makes more manifest.

The connection here is surely as plain as it is important. The Germany we are to have after the war will, in some form or other, be a Germany in which parliamentary government has at last become a substantial reality. The Center party is already making a striking bid for power in that new Germany. It is constituting itself the prophet of a régime, internally and externally, which will, in its large outlines, correspond to something like the peace that must be made. It is stating its program in such semi-religious phraseology as almost to invite the papal sanction. But a powerful Center means a powerful Rome. Whatever German Catholics achieve is in fact a triumph for papal diplomacy. No one who knows the inner history of the Kulturkampf can for a moment imagine that Herr Erzberger takes a single step without advice from the subtle strategists of the Vatican. They have done a political sum and are cashing their expenditure upon its total.

Nor is the Austrian case less clear. In the Dual Monarchy there is the last modern state where the Roman alliance has, at every historical stage, been held of decisive importance. Rome and Austria have the greatest bond of sympathy in their common hostility to the Italian advance. Austria is the last great stronghold of those principles of the Counter-Reformation of which modern Vaticanism is no more than the implicit development. Upon every phase of Austrian life, educational, political, economic, Roman clericalism has been able to set its mark. But the retention of Roman influence depends, very obviously, upon the retention of the present character of the Austro-Hungarian system. If the Hapsburgs were to go, it is undeniable that the basis of Roman power would be removed. If Austria, for example, were federalized, Roman Catholicism would have to compete on equal terms with a number of religions, and the historic claims of one, at least, of them to an equality with her own it would be more than difficult to deny. In such an analysis, it would obviously benefit Rome to proffer advice to Vienna upon which a claim to future gratitude can be

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based. No one can doubt that, from the Hapsburg point of view, what seems to be the Roman counsel is in a high degree worthy of praise, Nothing would be more likely to win popularity for the dynasty than a peace that showed promise of being near at hand. What Rome is promising the Emperor Charles as the fruits of her policy is the maximum preservation of his possessions relative to his difficult situation. Clearly he is attracted by the offer; and equally clearly, Rome will profit largely by the acceptance of her advice.

There will, of course, be those to whom such a decisive interference of Rome in the politics of the new Europe is an event fraught with the gravest danger. We do not share that view. In the first place it is hardly to be denied that, whatever be her motives, the direct tenor of her advice is likely to conduce to the kind of result towards which the Allies are slowly working. In the second, fear of Roman diplomacy is essentially an anachronism. We do not pretend to know if Roman Catholicism is a gaining religion. But anyone who is familiar with the history of Catholicism in the last thirty years will not have room for doubt that its political and intellectual influence is decidedly on the decline. The irreparable damage done to Rome by Pius X's repudiation of modernism has reverberated throughout the whole system. Simultaneously, the factors which influence the balance of power in the modern world have more and more been concentrated towards a direction where Roman influence can be of less and less account. Her present effort is nothing so much as a swan song, the more pathetic in that it is the dying expression of the last universal power. We have but to be grateful that its words are set to a music we can hear with not a little sympathy and gratitude.

Organization or Anarchy

THE I. W. W. owe much gratitude to the American press. They have never been able to win any substantial following among American wage workers. Their guerilla methods are alien to the spirit of the American labor movement. But, like Billy Sunday, they have a genius for the sensational. And just as Billy Sunday by turning handsprings before the altar and spitting at the devil across the footlights makes the headlines, while thousands who follow Christ in humble service go unnoted, so the I. W. W. by preaching sabotage, threatening to burn haystacks and pitching their camps in churches, get more publicity in a day than the thousand organizers of the American Federation of Labor achieve in a lifetime.

And the remarkable fact is that the imaginative persons who invent the newspaper headlines give the I. W. W. such extraordinary values. Terrorism is the I. W. W.'s stock in trade; but they are generally persons who love the open road, delight in adventure, and prefer to keep out of jail except for brief periods when the weather is unpropitious and the commissary is low. While preaching lawlessness, they are meticulous students of the law. They are past masters in inciting to violence without making themselves liable for its penalties. And they are adepts in getting the newspapers to give them credit for things which they themselves never do. During the great strike of the textile workers in Lawrence dynamite was discovered in dangerous proximity to the mills; certain I. W. W. leaders were thrown into jail. They were the sensation of the hour. When they came to trial their attorneys were able to prove that the dynamite had been planted by the forces of law and order. Last year they started a strike in the Mesaba iron range in Minnesota. A picket and a deputy sheriff were shot. Again a number of I. W. W. organizers were held for murder. They were later discharged by the courts. A shooting affray recently occurred at Everett, Washington, and some hundred followers of the I. W. W. were indicted. In a test case the defendant was acquitted and the remaining indictments were dismissed. In each case the newspapers starred the I. W. W. leaders as the heroes of melodramatic performances which were in reality not their work at all.

And now comes Bisbee. Certain copper mines in Arizona are shut down because of strikes engineered by the I. W. W. The small number of men involved and the comparatively slight menace to the war preparations of the country make these strikes intrinsically much less serious than the strikes that for weeks have crippled the ship-building yards in the vicinity of New York City. But the leaders of the I. W. W. are masters of their game. They are as clever in the use of phrases that provoke employers and officers of the law to violence as the picador in the use of his lance. The sheriff of Bisbee organizes and arms a posse, who corral some twelve hundred citizens, strikers and alleged strike sympathizers, herd them into cattle cars, and drop them in the desert without food or water. During the deportation, officers of a great mining corporation with headquarters in New York City forcibly seize the local telegraph office and impose a censorship upon Associated Press dispatches so that the deportation may not be interfered with by the authorities of neighboring towns or states. The acts of lawlessness are so gross that the President of the United States finds it expedient to telegraph the governor of Arizona,

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warning him against " the great danger of citizens taking the law into their own hands." It is impossible to discover from the subsequent news reports that a single one of these lawless acts was perpetrated by the I. W. W. And yet the headlines contrive to convey the impression that the I. W. W. was primarily responsible for all of them and that in consequence a flame of terror has spread from Bisbee throughout the entire West. A few noisy agitators are magnified into an army financed with German money, " whose activities have progressed to a point where the local and state authorities are unable to cope with them." In recognition of performances in themselves comparatively insignificant, the press blazons the I. W. W. forth in all the gorgeous trappings of the Pirates of Penzance.

How much the influence of the I. W. W. depends on the sensationalism of the press and the violence of the opposition Commissioner Woods of the New York Police Department showed several years ago when, instead of standing them against a wall and shooting them, as Mrs. Atherton recommends in last Sunday's New York Times, he gave them every possible opportunity to preach their doctrines on terms of equality with the Salvation Army and the Single Taxers. Under this discerning treatment they promptly sought more profitable fields. Kerensky has confirmed the wisdom of this policy by refusing to be badgered into official violence by the analogues of the I. W. W. in Petrograd. But the danger in sensationalizing the exploits of the I. W. W. is not so much that it whets their appetite for new adventure, as that it obscures the substantial social evils without which the organization could hardly exist at all. It has been the invariable rule that where the I. W. W. have been able to win a following even for the brief period of a single strike, conditions of employment have been un-American and intolerable. This was true at Lawrence; it was true in Paterson; it was true in the Mesaba range; and according to private reports it appears to be true in Bisbee. The strategy of the I. W. W. is not to deal with the more highly skilled and better paid workers to whom the patient methods of trade union organization and collective bargaining appeal, but with the unskilled and underpaid who have been so harshly exploited that they are on the point of spontaneous revolt and need only the touch of a match to set them off.

The aim of the I. W. W. is not collective bargaining or the democratic control of industry by the joint forces of capital and labor, but the paralysis through recurrent sporadic strikes of capitalist industry itself. Neither have they anything in common with the social program for the gradual extension of collectivism and public ownership. Their object is so to harass employers as to make private ownership unprofitable, on the theory that the employers will then surrender their properties to the operatives who work them. Their dream is not of a world federation of democratic states, but a world federation of industries syndicated into " one big union." Of all the radical philosophies theirs alone continues to support the view that the lot of the wage-worker grows more wretched day by day, and that the only escape from " wage slavery " is through persistent guerilla warfare, culminating eventually in revolution. Their opportunity depends upon the existence of industries where the management is autocratic, where the workers are denied a voice in the government of the mine or shop, and where conditions of employment are oppressive. The outbreak of a strike under their auspices is *prima facie* evidence that there is something wrong in the human relationships between the management and the men. The I. W. W. is not so much a labor movement as a symptom of industrial disease.

A week before the Bisbee deportations the owner of one of the Arizona copper mines, now at a dead stop because of the strike, was discussing the labor situation there. He himself believed in the settlement of industrial disputes through democratic conference and accommodation. But he was at a loss to know how to open negotiations with the strikers. It is the policy of his company to leave the local administration of its properties to resident managers whose efficiency is judged by the revenues they turn in. The manager of this Arizona mine was opposed on principle to the organization of the men and magnificently firm against the recognition of any union. Repeated attempts of the Western Federation of Miners—a constituent of the American Federation of Labor—to establish a basis for the orderly adjustment of grievances through some form of collective bargaining had been vigorously put down. His attitude was precisely that of the Metal Trades Association, whose refusal either to recognize or negotiate with the unions in the shipbuilding trades has kept the shipyards in the New York district idle for weeks. The management of the mine was strictly his own business, he thought, not to be interfered with by alien agitators. If the men had grievances, loyalty to the company required that they should present them individually at their own risk.

This combination of autocracy and exploitation gave the I. W. W. their chance. The men were ready to revolt. The I. W. W. applied the match. The situation baffled the absentee owner even while he described it. To deal with the I. W. W. was impossible; to attempt to negotiate a collective

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agreement through the Western Federation of Miners, who had lost their hold upon the men, would do no good. By denying the men the right of collective bargaining the management had brought anarchy down upon itself.

This situation is certain to be duplicated many times as our war with Germany progresses. As men are drawn from industry into the army and navy and the demand for increased output becomes pressing, we shall undoubtedly repeat much of the industrial experience of England. The policy of our government so far has been to leave the adjustment of labor disputes to the wisdom of employers and the patriotism of the men. Under this policy strikes have multiplied to an unprecedented extent. If the situation continues to develop to a point where it seriously interferes with the production of munitions, the government will be compelled to follow the precedent of England, take over pivotal industries, and establish some machinery of joint industrial control similar to that created by the English Munitions of War act. Short of direct governmental supervision the only practical means of averting situations like that at Bisbee is through the recognition by employers of the responsible trade unions who through the American Federation of Labor have pledged their support to the nation in the prosecution of the war. Under war conditions, the only alternative to some rational form of organization for collective bargaining and the orderly adjustment of disputes is anarchy.

Would Government Ownership Pay?

GOVERNMENT ownership of railways has found many of its severest critics among financial authorities. Granting that various social and political advantages might be derived from nationalized railways, they urge that these are advantages we cannot afford at the price. Our railways now are managed economically, on the whole, and what guaranty have we that they will not be more expensively conducted under government authority, with the result that deficits would annually recur to weigh down our budgets? Moreover, railway revenues necessarily fluctuate widely. Even if they produced a net return to the treasury, this would be at a minimum in times of depression, when revenues are most needed, and at a maximum in times of prosperity when all other public revenues flow abundantly.

The latter point we may consider first, since it is of undoubted validity. Railway revenues do fluctuate widely, and fluctuating revenues entail financial embarrassment. But fluctuations in railway revenue are not divested of their grave political and social import merely by excluding them from appearance in the public budget. When the revenues of our private railways fall to a minimum it is impossible to raise money for replacements and betterments, although at such periods labor and materials are likely to be abundant and cheap. We are at present living under a régime in which the railways retire from the market when their purchases are most urgently needed to reanimate a languishing industry, and return to the market when industry is overstrained by other demands. Just now when every ton of steel is eagerly sought for other uses, the railways are presenting their requirements for steel cars. A rational economic policy would somehow have provided the cars three years ago when steel was to be had at one-third of present prices. Private railways, however, are not in a position to pursue what is from the social point of view a rational economic policy. They must submit to the financial forces registered in fluctuating revenues.

Perhaps the government, if it owned the railways, would prove equally impotent to cope with the vicissitudes of prosperity and depression. This should not be the case, since government credit fluctuates, as a rule, much less than that of private companies. There is no reason why a government should not raise loans for railway betterments in time of depression and sink them with the abundant revenues flowing in time of prosperity. But even if the government accepted passively the evils of fluctuating revenues, this would represent no new experience for us. We already suffer from these evils even if they do not appear in the public budgets.

The instability of railway revenues is not conclusive argument either for or against nationalization. What is of much greater importance is the question of the fruitfulness of such a source of revenue. We could acquire the railways only by purchase at their full present value, and the interest on the purchase price would not be greatly inferior to the aggregate of interest and dividends we now pay to the private owners. The government would save nothing on the wages bill, nor could it afford to substitute underpaid civil servants for the high-salaried managing officials of the present régime. The government would have to learn the lesson of the ultimate economy of high salaries as well as of high wages. What assurance have we, then, that government ownership would yield any considerable surplus above interest charges and operating expenses? Such assurance we must have if we are to consider nationalization at all. After the war we shall be in no position to conduct unproductive enterprises. Our national expenses

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will have greatly increased, in consequence of our new national debt, our new pension list, our new defense requirements. Of our new revenue sources, the one upon which we are now most largely depending, the excess profits tax, is certain to dry up. How much more we can draw from the income tax after the war is an uncertain matter. We can increase the rates, but can we cope with evasion, when the current patriotic ferver has subsided? Perhaps. Nevertheless, we must consider seriously whether the railways could be made to yield a substantial revenue.

It appears to be the universal opinion of the men who know most about the subject that railway rates are well below the maximum that the traffic will bear. All the arguments presented by the railways in their appeal for a 15 per cent advance in freight rates were based upon the assumption that such an increase in rates would not perceptibly reduce the volume of freight offered for transportation. American railway rates are the lowest in the world. There seems to be no doubt at all that much of our traffic could afford to pay higher rates. Steel products worth now a hundred dollars a ton are paying practically the same rate as similar products worth forty dollars a ton were paying three years ago. Coal at present prices could pay much higher freights than it paid three years ago, and the same thing is true of wheat, corn, livestock and the whole range of products whose prices have increased. The case for increased freight rates was perfectly valid, as against the shippers. They could easily have paid higher charges. What was not clear was that the shippers should be made to make over part of their profits to the private railway owners. If the railways had been public property, it would have been possible and desirable to advance rates sufficiently to raise at least half a billion in additional revenues.

Public railways would serve not merely as an efficient instrument for diverting to the public treasury part of the excess profits of boom times. They might also be employed to skim much of the gain that now takes the form of unearned increment in private hands. If an exceptionally productive mining district is opened, the rates fixed by the private railways on the shipment of its products are chiefly determined by the rates on similar products from other districts that may be much less productive. There remains to the fortunate district a surplus above expenses that takes the form of royalties or is capitalized into the value of the mines. Similar surpluses appear wherever extensive irrigation projects are inaugurated; wherever great hydroelectric plants are installed; wherever important natural resources are made available through railway construction. In the future development of the United States such surpluses are sure to give rise to an enormous volume of unearned wealth. This would not be the case if railway rates were nicely adjusted on the principle of charging what the traffic will bear. We have not hitherto permitted such adjustment. As between the private railway and the private shipper, the popular sympathy falls to the latter. Matters would present a quite different face if the surpluses secured through charging what the traffic would bear accrued to the public treasury.

Opponents of government ownership lay great stress upon the possibility that government-owned railways may charge higher rates than the private railways now charge. But there is no objection to higher rates, so long as the surplus revenues are covered into the public treasury. Rates that do not exceed what the traffic will bear in the long run are not too high, from the point of view of general industry. They absorb only the surpluses that emerge after the necessary claims of labor and capital have been met. Such rates include as a rule a charge for service and an additional charge that is essentially of the nature of taxation. It is one of the least burdensome forms of taxation, resting mainly upon unearned increment. We have objected strenuously to the rigorous application by the private railways of the principle of charging what the traffic will bear. We did not want to place one private interest in a position to levy a tax upon other private interests. There is no valid reason why the charges of public railways should not be determined on this principle. On the contrary, the employment of such a principle, besides promising a fruitful source of revenue, would go far toward abating the evils of speculation and unmerited enrichment that have checked our progress toward economic democracy.

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EDITORS
HERBERT CROLY FRANCIS HACKETT
PHILIP LITTELL ALVIN JOHNSON
GEORGE SOULE—Assistant Editor
CHARLES MERZ, Washington Representative

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Aiding the Enemy's Diplomacy

THAT the changes in Russia did for the time being make worse the military situation of the Allies is patent enough. But they have so far improved their diplomatic position that, if properly used, the military disadvantage might in large part be offset. Yet so far there seems little disposition to profit by the diplomatic change, or indeed to make the quite necessary modification in our own policy demanded by the new circumstances.*

What from the beginning has been the ultimate, as apart from the incidental—though perhaps more visible—object of the war? It has been to prevent the formation of a great, powerful Central European block which, dominated by a militarist Prussia, would constitute a menace to the whole western world. Our method of meeting the danger of a Prussianized Central Europe has been based, first and last, upon setting up, athwart the German pathway to the East, independent states that should be able to resist the Austro-German pressure by the buttress of Russian power, reinforced by Italy and ourselves operating through the Mediterranean. That policy has, since the Russian Revolution, obviously become impossible.

Even though Russian military assistance remain active during the war, Russia is going to be too absorbed in her own internal problems, during our generation at least, to risk further wars for the purpose of supporting the foreign policy of the old régime. We might create M. Miliukoff's independent Bohemia with its subject German population. But if, ten years hence, it found its position untenable, side by side with a cohesive German block of ninety millions odd, can we imagine the Russian socialist federal republic, wrestling with inevitable internal difficulties and very probable reactionary movements, risking a succession of wars arising out of the complexities of Balkan politics? Does anyone any longer pretend that our policy in southeastern Europe, as it existed as late as the beginning of this year, is still practicable?

Yet there is more than a chance that the same end could be achieved in another fashion.

An American authority noted early in the war that "whatever else Germany might have conquered, she had conquered her allies"—Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey. If Germany won they would be her vassals; if she lost they would all but disappear. It is certain that a power like Austria did not relish the position of vassalage. What has prevented her—or for that matter the peoples of Central Europe as a whole—from seeing what seems self-evident to us, namely, that from the point of view of their ultimate freedom and well-being, they have much less to fear from our victory than from Prussia's? President Wilson in his last speech (June 14th) said:

> We know now clearly that we are not the enemies of the German people. . . . Austria has acted, not upon its own initiative, or upon the choice of its own people, but at Berlin's dictation, ever since the war began. Its people desire peace, but they cannot have it until leave is granted from Berlin.

If the President is right in this assumption that we are not opposing any vital interest of the peoples of Central Europe—and we believe it passionately, believe, that is, that they had no cause to fight us since we did not threaten their rights or interests in any way—then what has created a misconception which induces Germany's allies to accept so humiliating a position, and the German people themselves to suffer such long agonies for a victory which will not be for their welfare but merely for the ambition of a class that for the most part they detest?

Both the Austrian state on the one hand, and the Social-Democracy of Germany on the other, have been led into that humiliating position mainly by the bogey of "the Russian peril," the "pan-Slav menace." For Austria, vassalage to Berlin seemed the only alternative to Slav dominance and to dismemberment at the hands of Russia. The fear of the Slav overcame the fear of the Prussian. But since the Russian Revolution the fear of the Slav has largely disappeared. The Russian world is for a generation at least going to be too busy with its own upheaval and disorder to be a menace to anybody abroad (unless the danger to Russia itself should lead to a military dictatorship in that country, a dictatorship that might be pro-German).

It naturally takes time for the full meaning of a fact of this kind to sink into the consciousness of a whole people—especially a submissive and well drilled people like the German—and cause a revision of settled opinions. But already it is having its effect.

The Prussian can no longer create panic in the Austrian mind with the bogey of pan-Slavism. Hence the obvious change in the relations between Vienna and Berlin. The new emperor is display-

* Note—At the time this article was written the German Reichstag crisis had not taken place, and the Allies had not announced their conference for a revision of war aims. It is now still more pertinent.—THE EDITORS.

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ing an attitude which has already excited the wrath of the German jingoes. He is reviving the policy which aims at satisfying the claims of Slav nationality within the framework of the Dual Monarchy. Undoubtedly if he did not look to Germany for defense he would go farther still.

Meantime a parallel movement is going on against the domination of Prussian policy in Germany itself. The main factor in rendering the Social-Democrats so pitiably helpless in resisting the war aims of the Prussian has been also the bogey of Czarist Russia. It was the argument of "the Russian peril" which made it impossible for the more stalwart minorities in Germany to make any headway among the general public, and helped to prevent the increasing suffering of the great mass from finding expression in political protest. There is thus taking place an alliance, or community of aim, between the Austrian Empire and parties within Germany itself in resistance to Prussian overlordship.

This fissure is of course only just beginning to reveal itself. Were it to deepen, however, the German government would have increasing difficulty in maintaining its internal position. The instrument it uses would become less pliable and less reliable; and as conditions become more acute the block might show increasing tendencies to disintegration. How many of us have grasped the real significance of the fact that if the statement of President Wilson to the effect that we are opposing no real interest of the German people is really true—and to us it seems self-evident—the Central Empires hold together and carry on the war simply because the masses of their people are the victims of a disastrous illusion? If these could be brought to see what seems obvious to us, the war would stop in a week by the utter collapse of the morale of the army and navy, by vast desertions, by sabotage in munition works, by the hundred and one ways by which a people determined not to fight simply do not fight.

That we have a great belief in the value of merely civilian pressure on Germany we admit by the fact of maintaining the blockade. We know that the army and navy will suffer last of all from any shortage. What we are aiming at is the cretion of pressure against the government by the suffering of civilian population.

Yet ever since the beginning of the war we have in our policy deliberately offset this intended effect of the blockade by doing our best to persuade the German and the Austrian that verily he must look only to the triumph of the Prussian for protection; that we shall give him none at all. It is true that in one message we have repudiated any idea of "destroying German nationality," whatever that may mean. But a phrase in an official message has as little chance of reaching the real consciousness of the enemy peoples as the weird schemes of scattering leaflets by aeroplane in enemy towns or trenches. Not so does a whole people argue itself from falsehood into truth. What impresses them is the general aspect of our policy as they gather it from our press, our public actions, our reiterated declarations. Where in that press, or in those declarations, have we ever given the subject peoples of Central Europe the assurance that after the war we would protect them from the enemies that rightly or wrongly they have feared; from Russian Pan-Slavism, British tariffism, Balkan intrigue, French vengeance, or what not? The statement of our war aims so far made not only does nothing to aid those forces within the Central Empires which are so indispensable to our success (for so long as the Prussian can count upon the support of the solid block of Central Europe we shall not destroy his militarism even though we win the war) but tends to aid those welding forces which it is our desire to undermine.

We have, in one form or another, proclaimed our main war aims to be about as follows:

(1) The destruction of Prussian militarism.

(2) The rearrangement of European frontiers on a basis of nationality.

(3) "War after the war" against German trade.

We have emphasized the last by an Allied Conference on methods of carrying the policy into effect—a proof of seriousness of intention not accorded to the other items.

Our censorship has so operated as to encourage in the enemy countries a maximum interpretation of this program. That is to say, while papers of the Morning Post and National Review order, with their "thorough" policy of crushing Germany now and in the future, have been allowed very free circulation here and abroad, organs favoring a liberal interpretation of the above program have been discriminated against as "pro-German," with the result that the censorship has played the game of the German and Austrian militarist parties, by enabling them, on the strength of the statements of our reactionary press, to argue in this wise:

> The destruction of German military power means that we are to be deprived in future of any effective method of national defense, and that we shall be at the mercy of any enemy that cares to affront us. We are fighting for the right to defend ourselves, the most elementary form of political freedom.
>
> The liberation of subject nationalities is a euphemism for the dismemberment of Austria and the subjugation of German and Magyar minorities to hostile rule; while the economic program of the Paris Conference is sufficient proof that our people and their

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children will be deprived of their fair opportunity in the world, of that economic expansion so necessary for an increasing population. We must defend our right to those things with our own power.

It is not a question of whether this is a correct interpretation of our aims, but of whether our policy has made it possible for the enemy governments so to represent them, and of what chance it has given to the democratic minority in Germany, or the liberal and home rule minority Austria, to make headway in their respective countries.

The truth is that our general surrender to the temper of wartime has caused us to disregard as negligible the political, economic, and moral forces at work within the Central Empires. We have taken no trouble to utilize them for the purpose of our policy. How could we do so?

Let us imagine a new Paris Conference of the Allies—or a Washington Conference would be better still—meeting to consider among themselves the character of the "guaranties" which they expect not only to receive, but to give; and as a result of their deliberations making it plain that:

(1) The new Society of Nations which the Allies constitute will stand for the valid rights of a peaceful, law-abiding Germany as much as for those of a Belgium or a Serbia, and will pledge themselves to protect not only the small state from aggression, but the great as well.

(2) The Allies will not attempt to remedy one wrong by creating another, in Austria or elsewhere. They are prepared to accept such modification of the old conception of national sovereignty and independence as may be necessary in order to make a real Society of Nations workable and the freedom of one state compatible with the welfare of another.

(3) A Germany or an Austria that is prepared to accept the obligations—freedom for subject peoples, some limitation of armaments, or what not—which attach to membership in the new international society, will also be accorded its privileges: equality of economic opportunity in areas that have in the past been the cause of dissension, access to the sea, economic rights of way through foreign territory.

President Wilson, while still a neutral, proclaimed these as the things for which America would be prepared to stand. Let the Allies proclaim them as the things for which they stand as belligerents.

In shifting the discussion from immediate territorial readjustments to future international arrangements and Germany's place therein, the Allies would have this immense advantage: they would be dealing with matters in which the balance of forces is in their favor instead of against them. When we make claims for large territorial rectifications, the Germans are in a position to remind us of the war-map; but when we come to the question of Germany's future privileges in the world at large, we are entitled to say:

The war map may show in your favor; but you are absolutely unable to impose your will on any of your major enemies. We, the Western Allies, have created a Society of Nations, dominating not only western Europe, but the whole of the New World, the whole of Africa, and virtually the whole of Asia. If you hold your conquests and create a militarized Mitteleuropa at the cost of exclusion from the privileges of such a Society of Nations, you will lose immeasurably more than you will gain.

The argument presented by such an alternative would appeal not only to everything that has in the past fought autocracy in the Central Empires—the Social Democrats, the subject nationalities, the liberals—but to the great commercial and industrial interests that have heretofore supported imperialism. Commercial and industrial Germany would not lightly face permanent exclusion from, or unfavorable treatment in South America, Asia, Africa.

It comes to this—That in our international relationships we have neglected the large part of the persuasive and coercive moral forces by which society normally deals with the recalcitrant member, the criminal. The real social control in any community is not merely the threat of punishment—crime is often worst where the punishments are most ferocious—but the positive advantages offered to every member in obeying the law and accepting its obligations. Not only do we say: "Break the law and we will punish you"; but we also say: "Obey the law and we shall see that it protects you, and that you enjoy its advantage." And it is that part of the "sanction" which is probably the most operative.

But the analogous sanction, to be applied by the Allies to Germany, although powerful at present, is destined probably to lose much of its force with the passage of time. The more the stress of war compels Germany to become self-sufficing, the less will the threat of our blockade and the hope of access to our raw materials weigh with her. Turkish cotton, wood pulp cellulose, synthetic rubber, are so many weapons drawn from our armory.

But since this inducement, or pressure, or offer, whichever you care to call it, can be applied without in any way stopping or slackening the war, by means of the Allied Conference and Declaration indicated above, statesmanship would indicate some such step immediately.

We have never made any real offer to the German and Austrian peoples as apart from their governments of after-the-war protection by means of a real League of Nations. We have, on the contrary, with our vague talk of "the destruction of

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German militarism" and our definite plans at the Paris Conference for differentiation against German trade, done the precise opposite. We have in fact, in our diplomacy, played the game of the enemy governments. It is time that we played our own.

NORMAN ANGELL.

London.

The Literary Guy

NO one is astonished when he hears that a stockbroker is a pretty good boxer. A stockbroker is a "regular fellow." But when one is told that Maeterlinck is a pretty good boxer, one is astonished. Maeterlinck is a "literary guy." There is scarcely any difference in the working conditions of stockbrokers and book-writers. The work in each case is indoors, mercilessly exacting while it lasts, calling equally for concentration and endurance and speed. The occupational diseases are also the same—so-called nervous breakdown, dyspepsia and thirst. But for all the similarities the world is not of one mind about these species. It looks on one of these two male types with powerful romantic favor, on the other either with repressed suspicion or with embarrassed interest. And it is not the broker who is so charily received.

An explanation may be offered for this distinction. What keeps the broker so romantic is not his strapping gait or the ribbon in his cocky hat. It is the promise that some day at the end of his rainbow there will be a pot of gold. The author is a drooped and shambling figure not so much because he is actually shabby as because he gives so little promise of ever flying about town in a car. The broker who has a car may be insolvent. The author who has a car may be as dependable as the golden goose. But for one person who thinks of the dashing stockbroker as fraudulent, there are a hundred who really can't see why the author does it. After the impecunious clergyman and the penurious professor, the indigent author is a most settled popular conception. One has only to suppose a clergyman ordering champagne, a professor buying orchids, an author invading the Ritz or the Blackstone, to feel the ache of a piteous incongruity.

Imagine an old author who dressed like Russell Sage. Everything that Russell Sage used to wear had a shine, except his shoes. Had he been a mumbling author instead of a money-bag, how people would have shunned him, for then his shabbiness would have stood for economic failure instead of eccentricity, and nothing is deemed so tiresome in an old man as the evidence that he hasn't "made good." Russell Sage "made good." Threadbare and dilapidated as he was, he stood for so many dollars that men quaked when they approached him. He had a halo even among the office-boys of Wall Street—and always when it comes to popular halo there is no comparison between the author and the most moth-eaten millionaire. There are two very dull clubs in New York: one excludes men who haven't written a book and the other practically excludes men who haven't acquired a million. The authors do not take their books any less seriously than the moneyed men take their millions. Both clubs are stupefyingly egotistic. But when it comes to the deference that has been inculcated in curtains and armchairs and mirrors and marble, in bellboys and doormen and servitors, the mere literary men are as ineffectual as a blunt lawn-mower. By sheer pressure they may compel deference in their club but, as soon as they have passed, those that have bent resume their upright state. Before the men of wealth, however, everything goes down like grass under the razor's edge. It is not by any means because of a difference in the scale of wages, though manners are of course a marketable commodity with servants, as with actors and clergymen and doctors. It has also something to do with wealth itself. The boastful consciousness of knowing Midas is not confined to less successful business associates. The steward who serves the great man with huckleberry pie and a glass of milk is also in his orbit, and feels the metallic attraction of Midas even in feeding him pie.

But think, you may conventionally retort, of the admiring ladies who like nothing so well as an author or an authorette. Think of the lapdog poet. Are the poets despised because of their lamentable economic aspect? Are the parlor iconoclasts, wreaking massacre among the conversational clay-pigeons, at any disadvantage because they are poor? Do they not rather wear a halo where the tea-party stockbroker wears a hang-dog look? Yes, but what kind of halo? The literary guy is all the more a literary guy in the neighborhood of bibelots and bric-à-brac. He is a condiment, a confection, a meringue. The fashionable women who want him on hand are women like those of Fragonard, little as they admit it in an age of sansculotterie. Outside their well-garnished establishment there is a pretty summer-house where it is amusing to give one's finger-tips to novelty. This is not a place that does honor to the writer but a place where he is given little liberties, like the marmoset that may perch on a shoulder and play with a curl. If the marmoset misbehaves, the lady expects to spank him and send him back to his lair. It is on exceedingly few occasions that

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the meal-ticket stockbroker is of less importance in the end than the young writer who is asked to his dinners and allowed to berate his stocks and stones.

Not that authors or professors or clergymen are all doomed to poverty. Most of them shall never have a decent balance in the bank, try as they may. Most of them are indeed committed to discomfort, privation, probable defeat by attrition, and especially to the ironic misrepresentation that because there is extravagance and waste among the poor there is therefore no genuine economic injustice and no remediable economic cruelty. But in spite of this common rule of poverty for brainworkers outside ordinary industry, the idea that authorship ought to be despised as non-lucrative is rapidly ceasing to be applicable. Even if honor should only attach to lucrative occupations, authorship is not nearly so despicable as it was in the days of the hand-press and the small edition and the patron. Like dentistry and journalism and hog-slaughter, it is becoming too profitable for at least its luckier practitioners to justify the habitually slighting and jocular attitude. A change in economic condition may easily go ahead of prestige. It would be hard, however, to find anywhere a case where a source of wealth was so distasteful to mankind that prestige did not finally seep back from the wealth that was acquired to the occupation by which it was acquired. The stockyards stink all over Chicago, and yet guides are kept busy taking visitors from one sight of slaughter to another. A guano millionaire is as little likely to disguise the source of his revenue as a Vanderbilt or a Waldorf Astor or a Belmont is reluctant to lend his regal name to a hotel. There is no reason, then, to suppose that authors in the end should not come to be known as well-off, and therefore "regular fellows"—correspondingly muscular, virile, lavish, romantic.

What one could wish, if we did not live in an economic miasma, would be that the author should be taken for what he really is, a person who happens to be translating into words the meaning that life has for him, indicating above everything his closeness to life rather than a detachment from it. By the very fact that he writes validly, a writer is sure that life has a meaning for him, and is thereby part of him and he of it. But this plain fact is not uppermost in most people's minds when they think of a writer. They think he is detached from "life," meaning by that nothing more or less than the pursuit of wealth. And for that reason they are astonished when they hear that an author, like a broker, is a man.

F. H.

Trading With the Enemy

NO one denies that in a time of war the interdiction of trade with an enemy is a necessary procedure. According to American law one of the immediate consequences of belligerency is the suspension of business relations with the nation upon which war has been declared. Traditionally this has meant for the United States the restriction of enemy trade on a basis of domicile rather than of nationality. So long as an enemy citizen did not have his residence or place of business in hostile territory, his allegiance to an enemy country was held to be no cause for placing a ban on his commerce. A German merchant in Brazil, not acting as an agent for his government, was as far outside the scope of orthodox American restriction as the native Brazilian himself.

For the first time, however, the United States now enters into a world war, when the interlocking of business activities in one country with those in another has made impossible the old ease in viewing separate parts of the world as unrelated units whose interests do not have an immediate effect upon those of all other units. It is less clear than it would have been, fifty years ago, that the German merchant in Brazil has a standing different from that of the German in Berlin. However else it has changed, the policy of interdicting trade solely on a basis of domicile is at least far less effective as a weapon of warfare.

It is because the Trading with the Enemy bill which was passed in the House of Representatives last week so closely parallels an early Trading with the Enemy act of Parliament that British experience in this respect is instructive. England, like this country—and unlike France—had an historic policy of restricting enemy trade upon grounds of domicile, and it was with the intention of adhering to that policy that England began the war. The first action of the government in dealing with enemy trade was a proclamation, issued on the day following the declaration of war, warning British subjects to have no commercial intercourse with the enemy. So well understood was the policy of restriction according to domicile assumed to be, that the proclamation did not go so far as to define the term "enemy." Two weeks later, however, to

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promote confidence and certainty in British commerce, the government authorized an explanation which was followed shortly by a confirmatory act of Parliament. For the purpose of deciding what transactions with foreign traders were legitimate, it held that the important thing to consider was not the trader's nationality, but his place of carrying on business. Accordingly there was, as a rule, no objection to be made to British trade with a German or Austrian firm established in Allied or in neutral territory. In fact, if a firm with headquarters in Germany or Austria had a branch in an Allied or neutral country, trade with that branch, if bona fide and involving no transaction with the head office, was held to be legitimate and not unpatriotic.

No doubt this decision of England, at the beginning of the war, not to shift from what had been a traditional policy was in part reached as the result of a conviction that national interests would be promoted by interfering as little as possible with the trade of neutral nations. It was not long, however, before the prospect of German merchants in Africa and in the Orient, prospering as middlemen between the English exporter and the local consumer, began to irritate the never wholly complacent trade consciousness of Great Britain. As economics are defined by such bodies as the Paris conference, the theory of restricting enemy trade wholly on a basis of domicile—so spontaneously adopted at the beginning of the war—was being proved poor economics. Accordingly, after ten months' experimentation with the policy of trade restriction on a theory of domicile, it was determined that the continuation of such a principle as an exclusive policy was no longer expedient. A proclamation of June 25th, 1915, declared that in the future restrictions upon trade should apply to any person or firm of enemy nationality resident in Morocco, China, Siam and Persia in the same manner as they applied to persons or firms resident in an enemy country. A German merchant in certain parts of the Far East was thus placed on the same footing as a German merchant in Brazil. Four months later the scope of the first restrictions was extended to cover Liberia and Portuguese East Africa.

There was thus developed, as a weapon of trade warfare, a policy of conflicting theories, based neither upon domicile nor upon nationality, but upon a combination of both. Trade with German firms in China and Africa could have been shut off, not in the fear that goods imported or credit amassed from exports might be smuggled into Germany, but as part of a trade war offensive. For a time this limited form of the new policy prevailed; but it was not long before England went over more definitely and generally to a practice of trade interdiction based upon grounds of nationality. The Extension of Powers act, passed by Parliament on December 25th, 1915, declared that royal proclamation might at any time prohibit British trade with persons or firms in any part of the world, "whenever by reason of their enemy nationality or enemy association it appears to His Majesty expedient so to do." Provision was made for the publication from time to time of prohibited firms in a list which might be varied or added to in an order made by the Lords of the Council on recommendation of a Secretary of State.

This act of Parliament prepared the way, of course, for the first of the blacklists: by proclamation of February 29th, 1916, there were designated two hundred and thirty-two firms, chiefly in neutral Europe, with which British trade could no longer be sanctioned. This first list, as the initiation of a new international policy, wisely selected as its objective firms in Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands from which Germany might be gaining a considerable importation. Later lists, however, brought additions more clearly the result of a principally national offensive. An Order in Council, in March, 1916, added several hundred South American firms to the blacklist; and in July American firms, eighty-four in all, were for the first time included. At the time of the entrance of this country into the war, twenty-two revisions has brought the total number of firms on the British blacklist up to more than three thousand.

Whatever course future developments take, this country is to start meeting its problems in enemy trade much as England started. The Trading with the Enemy bill which the House passed last week is in the spirit of the act of Parliament of September 18th, 1914, which, in spite of the later resort to a policy of blacklist, is still a law of England. In the House bill an "enemy" is defined as an individual or firm, regardless of nationality, resident within German territory. The definition also includes allies of an enemy, though here a continuation of the policy of the American government in trying to split Central Europe wisely permits the President by proclamation to suspend the provisions of the act insofar as they apply to Germany's allies.

But while the general provisions of the bill are thus based upon the theory of domicile, which has from the first been a principle of American international attitude, there is one section of the bill, discretionary rather than mandatory, which implies a quite different theory. If the President finds that "the safety of the United States or the successful prosecution of the war so require," he is given authority to proclaim as enemies "such other in-

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dividuals or bodies of individuals as may be natives, citizens, or subjects of any nation with which the United States is at war, *wherever resident or wherever doing business.*" There is thus established, partly, no doubt, with a desire to profit by British experience here as in all other war measures, an interdiction that may be put into force on nationalistic principles, as well as one that is mandatory, on a basis of the trader's place of business. Thus at the very outset there is proposed for the United States a certain form of the blacklist to which the British government did not have recourse until fourteen months after the war had been in progress. The German merchant in Brazil is at once made as assailable as the German merchant in Berlin. The discretionary authority of the President, if made use of, will mark a departure from conventional American policy.

It was upon this section that opposition centered, when the bill was before the House, and the same dissatisfaction will no doubt appear when the bill is brought up in the Senate. Congress, which found it not easy to appropriate billion dollar loans while the British blacklist of American firms was still in force, does not take readily to the idea of delegating to the President discretionary authority to interdict trade on a theory strange to American tradition. There is, however, this distinction between the present English and the proposed American applications of a blacklist policy: while the British theory permits the blacklisting of a firm in neutral or friendly territory on account of its "nationality or enemy association," the American blacklist, if resorted to, must be solely on a basis of nationality. Thus, though by proclamation of the President the government might forbid trade with a German merchant in Brazil, it could not, fortunately for Pan-American relations, forbid trade with a neutral merchant in Brazil, whose "enemy association" made him for one reason or another an undesirable correspondent.

This country, then, begins the war with a clear, if limited, shift in its policy in respect to the entanglements of enemy trade. As the administration's measure is designed, the country will adhere to its orthodox policy of prohibiting trade on a basis of domicile; it will also go beyond, and, in a less drastic form than the British blacklist, prohibit trade with merchants of enemy nationality, regardless of their place of business, if the success of the war should so demand. The first half of this program will not greatly alter existing conditions: trade with Germany and her allies has since the beginning of the war been chiefly theoretical. What will be the effect of the discretionary authority given to the President to prohibit trade with persons and firms of enemy nationality depends upon whether that authority is invoked as a military or as an economic weapon. To cut off a German firm in South America, suspected of supplying coal to a German raider, from what coal it receives from this country is a military measure of limited effect upon American commerce as a whole; and as an instrument for the possible coercion of neutrals the powers delegated are inferior to those contained in the embargo sections of the Espionage act. But used economically, to injure Germany by crushing German enterprise in every part of the world, the practical effects of the Trading with the Enemy bill would be even more extensive than its political effects upon American policy. Fortunately there is yet no evidence that the bill will be used for such a purpose.

CHARLES MERZ.

France of the Workman

IT is already a platitude that on the industrial eminence of nations in wartime depends the success of their armies—manufacture is the first degree of military activity. Germany had recognized this, and calculated an industrial effort to parallel her military effort. France and England were less foresighted, and in both countries labor and industry have been obliged to make a giant endeavor to meet emergency demands. In France, where before the war the luxuries rather than the necessities of the world were produced; where qualitative standards, beauty and delicacy and perfection of workmanship, still prevailed, the changes in equipment, in personnel, in conditions of factory work have been revolutionary. Every trade has had to save itself as it might, and the industrial clock, since 1914, has jumped forward some fifty years. Meanwhile the man-power of the country has been enormously reduced on the battlefield. These facts, as experts who look forward to reconstruction well realize, bring France to a turning point in her industrial history. There may be two views as to whether the change is progress or retrogression, but any hope of reversion to antebellum conditions is chimerical. Books like M. Victor Cambon's États-Unis-France show an effort to popularize in France the example of America. An arresting statement of the French side of the problem is to be found in two small volumes by M. Pierre Hamp: La Victoire de la France sur les Français and La France, Pays Ouvrier (Nouvelle Revue Française 1915-1916).

To remain a great nation France must become an industrial nation of the modern intensive sort:

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this is M. Hamp's thesis. Of what use is a merely spiritual victory and how, save by an increase in the national riches, are widows and orphans and men who can no longer work to be compensated for their sacrifice and maintained in comfort? Not only material wellbeing, but liberty of thought and political independence are subordinate "to the victory of this mechanical power which pure thought has so greatly abused in the name of a civilization called charming because it lacked modern equipment." France has conquered the Frenchman by showing him that it is no longer sufficient to think nobly: labor has by war been restored to its rightful and exact place. The workman has proved more vital than the man of letters or the artist. "On the application of every man to his trade rests the honor and the interest of peoples." In the forty-four years of peace which preceded 1914 French industry had begun to yield to her present enemy even in France itself. German dyes, seeds, skins, locomotives; German capital, German engineers—how is she to replace this vast activity? To talk of "destroying" German industry is futile. Only the improvement of her own industry and commerce will avail. French aeroplane motors, French agricultural machinery, these must in the future have the same reputation the world over that French books, French pictures, French embroidery have to-day.

Industrial victory, M. Hamp believes, can be accomplished by three means: automatic machinery, immigration, woman's labor. All of these—a matter of course in America where raw materials have been plenty, labor scarce, and trade traditions lacking—threaten the old French trade honor, and run counter to fixed prejudices. For in France raw materials have been scarce and dear, labor relatively plenty, and the worker's inveterate attachment to his trade as a craft, his affection for ancestral processes which maintain the skill of his hand and the pride of his heart, have led him to oppose changes in equipment step by step. When employers tried to introduce the Jacquart mechanical looms, the workmen threw them into the Rhone; and in the same spirit, they greeted the Northropp automatic looms. From the guilds the *compagnons,* those early precursors of the trades unions, inherited their traditions; and syndicalism has them from *compagnonnage.* The Prud'hommes have protected the legal rights of the working man by judgment of his peers, and esprit de corps has persisted in spite of the wider class solidarity, in spite of strikes. The worker has struck, not in disgust with his trade, but from a sense of social justice which is as rooted in his history as his trade pride.

His recalcitrance to modern invention has been reënforced by an unwillingness on the part of manufacturers to invest in labor-saving devices; a long habit of narrow economy, a desire to retire at fifty with a competence, have made them slow to experiment. But now that the safety of nations has proved subordinate to their industrial productivity, French manufacturers, says M. Hamp, must scrap their old machinery, risk their capital, and introduce intensive work and scientific management; and the workers, on their side, must learn obedience to the modern machine which demands the extinction of individual pride and inventiveness, and greater speed. Up to now the love of the job and the hatred of the fortune on which he depended have been stronger in the worker than his desire for money. He has been content to live without comforts and conveniences, and the politics of his trade have been directed not towards raising wages, but towards maintaining a standard wage at a slow rate of speed. He has honestly believed that greater productivity on his part served only his employer. Unfortunately, the first applications of the theories of Frederick Taylor were confirmation of the suspicion. The penurious employer used time-studies, for instance, not to obviate a muscular movement by a patent device, but to accelerate it for the sake of profit. The manufacturer has now seen the light, and the vast quantity of new hands recruited in the metal trades, largely women, and workmen without traditions, are docile to indispensable innovations, ready to labor at high speed, and keen for high wages. The experimental evidence which this new corporate body offers will go far towards the conversion of the workman of the old school. But employers must frankly recognize that for his sacrifice of personal satisfaction in work of the old sort, for his increased fatigue, he must be compensated by an increased wellbeing: better conditions in the factory, a higher wage, which will permit a better home, and a shorter working day. Moreover, American methods cannot be introduced wholesale without consideration of the vitality of French traditions. They must be Gallicized, and in this adaptation the workmen themselves should collaborate.

As to immigration, *la France aux Français* had in fact ceased to hold, even before the war. Polish, Austrian and Belgian workmen were employed in the north, Italians in the south, and on the Mediterranean and in the Normandy, Chinese. Paris alone had 200,000 foreign workers. This infiltration was, however, more or less accidental, and immigrants were fewer and less desirable in France than in Germany because wages were lower, and cost of living higher. A depleted France, as M. Hamp points out, must aim to attract and to accept only robust and tonic elements of immigra-

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tion. High wages are essential, so are restrictive laws; and science must study immigrant labor in relation to climatology, resistance and so on. But the crux of the problem is still the psychology of the French workman. Will he have the wisdom to accept the foreigner, give him syndicalist training, and a genuine share in the corporate life of the worker? If not, his own future will be greatly imperiled. The only alternatives, says M. Hamp, are the increased "taylorisation" of the French workman, greater care to protect his life and health, and the employment of women.

Before the war the French workman regarded the competition of woman's labor as destructive to wage standards, and refused her admittance wherever possible. The sewing trades were considered her field; and the great mass worked at home at starvation rates. Women were employed in the textile mills of the north, and also in glass-blowing; but other hard and dirty trades like metallurgy, as well as favorable trades like typography, were the prerogative of the male. Since 1914, however, the French woman has taken a man's place everywhere, and with such success that employers are installing machinery to save her heavy burden-bearing, in the hope of making her a permanent force. She has her share beside man in the cyclopean labors of the forge; in munitions work, where she earns a wage equal to his, she has almost eliminated man: for she has proved an excellent mechanic, and in the verification of shell fuses, for instance, her old training in embroidery and lace-making has given her hand and eye remarkable accuracy and skill. Out of 8,000 verifications by 800 women in a certain factory one day, only one mistake was made.

The working woman was when war broke out far behind even her English and American sisters in corporate consciousness. In home work she was often ready to undercut a rival; in the factory she has proved ambitious of money, and still more of glory: the element of jealousy has been used by her employers to speed up rival teams, and there is danger that in the reconstruction period they may by similar means seek to avoid increasing the wage scale to the level of England and Germany. On the other hand, if the French woman learns to respect corporate solidarity, man can no longer exclude her from the factory. She has earned her place there by a high patriotism which has kept her at her job night and day, and even under fire, and by a magnificent ability. She, for her part, has tasted the joys of independence and good wages, and will never consent to return to her old miserable labors. What about her drudgery as a wife and mother—is the family to be sacrificed? To M. Hamp the sterilization and the infant mortality which result from the factory work of women are serious obstacles to their permanent employment. He writes not as an anti-feminist, indeed with great understanding of the woman's side of the case; yet he cites figures from the textile region to prove that the eternity of France, that is, an adequate number of Frenchmen, depends on her return to the profession of motherhood. In the long view, he considers the foreigner less destructive of French nationality than the woman in industry.

Before the war, M. Hamp was always looking for a happy workman. Social discontent, due to an inherent injustice, sabotage, and disgust with modern machinery had combined to lower the place of labor. As he has told us in another beautiful book called Le Travail Invincible, and reiterated in La France, Pays Ouvrier, war has restored the mysticism of manual work, given it the sort of spiritual significance that it had in the Middle Ages. As the cathedral builder saw God behind his carved stone, so the munitions worker sees the destiny of France behind her steel. To do a good day's work is no longer enough, one must do all there is to be done. The worker's effort is on the same plane of necessity as military effort; but it is less honorable because of the soldier's greater peril. This danger decreases as the effort of the factory worker increases. During the battle of Verdun, at a certain forge for "155" shells the man's day passed at one bound to eighteen hours, and to such speed that the proportion of sick and exhausted reached eleven per cent. The soul of his labor lifts the workman above fatigue, and social equity is dominated by the fury to keep for France her just place in the world. Work has found a nobility of which it despaired. "France has been constrained to an experience which has revealed her to herself. She will know how to make her force endure by maintaining to industry the power invented for battle. Her organization of victory will create her industrial rank. Let her fashion peace of the same stuff of which she has fashioned war. Complete victory is within her. From fighting France will arise the France of the workman."

Compare Hamp's Le Rail, a story of the railway strike of 1909, with La France, Pays Ouvrier, and you will realize that France's spiritual rebirth is not an invention of the intellectuals. Hamp writes always as an industrial specialist who is at once the noblest advocate, the sternest critic, and the brother-in-arms of the French workman. The workman's future is the future of his country; and after digesting Hamp's relentless logic who will dare feel sentimental regrets at its implication that beauty of manual technique is being routed from its last stronghold? If this Frenchman can throw

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over trade traditions that he adores, approve the relaxation of labor laws for which he has fought, it is so that the France of tomorrow may be a better place to live in than the France of yesterday. The era of automatic work, he cries, may become not the curse but the liberation of the workman, by simplifying his effort and furnishing him subsistence in a few daily hours. If anyone can make his leisure creative, echoes the reader, it will be the workman of France.

ELIZABETH SHEPLEY SERGEANT.

Trivia

Bligh House

TO the West, in riding past the walls of Bligh, I remembered an incident in the well known siege of that house, during the Civil Wars: How, among Waller's invading Roundhead troops, there happened to be a young scholar, a poet, and lover of the Muses, fighting for the cause, as he thought, of ancient Freedom; who, one day, when the siege was being more hotly urged, pressing forward and climbing a wall, suddenly found himself in a quiet old garden by the house. And here, for a time, forgetting, as it would seem, the battle, and heedless of the bullets that now and then flew past him like peevish wasps, the young officer stayed, gathering roses—old-fashioned damask roses, streaked with red and white—which for the sake of a Court Beauty, there besieged with her father, he carried to the house; falling, however, struck by a chance bullet, or shot perhaps by one of his own party. A few of the young Officer's verses, written in the stilted fashion of the time, and almost unreadable now, have been preserved. The lady's portrait hangs in the white drawing room at Bligh; a delicate, simpering, faded figure, with ringlets and drop-pearls, and a dress of amber-colored silk.

In Church

"FOR the Pen," said the Vicar; and in the sententious pause that followed, I felt that I would offer any gifts of gold to avert or postpone the solemn, inevitable, hackneyed, and yet, as it seemed to me, perfectly appalling statement, that "the Pen is mightier than the Sword."

Parsons

ALL the same I like Parsons; they think nobly of the Universe, and believe in Souls and Eternal Happiness. And some of them, I am told, believe in Angels—that there are Angels who guide our footsteps, and flit to and fro on errands, in the air, unseen about us.

L. PEARSALL SMITH.

CORRESPONDENCE

Correction from Mr. Eustis

SIR: I am much interested and, on the whole, pleased by your article in your issue of June 30th entitled The Ship Emergency. It makes a comprehensive and intelligent statement of this matter. I am sorry, however, to find in it this statement: "The statements that Mr. Eustis and Mr. Clark thereafter sent to the press, making various criticisms of their chief and alleging delay in the construction of the ships, led General Goethals to discharge them from the Emergency Fleet Corporation."

I attach hereto copy of the statement which I made to the press which I read to the reporters that I might have an exact record of my words. I was particularly careful not to criticize my chief or to allege anything against him. Since your article clearly and conspicuously gives the opposite inference I shall appreciate it if you will correct, in an equally conspicuous way, this wrong impression.

I am led to ask this because you have given this shipping matter such a fair and detailed statement. My statement was published correctly and in full in a number of leading papers at the time it was issued.

F. A. EUSTIS.

Washington, D. C.

[NOTE: While Mr. Eustis maintains that his statement did not criticize General Goethals, the contrary inference was taken by practically every one, including General Goethals. The New York World on June 8th said that Mr. Eustis and his aid, Mr. Clark, "issued statements virtually charging General Goethals with halting building of the vessels by prescribing an impossible form of contract"; and the New York Evening Post of the same date asserted that Messrs. Eustis and Clark "take direct issue with Goethals' assertion that it is hopeless to try to build a thousand emergency wooden ships." Whatever technical neutrality Messrs. Eustis and Clark wished to maintain in their statements, the impression they conveyed was decidedly unfavorable to their chief, and it is significant that they were not in the least surprised when his answer was to discharge them.—THE EDITORS.]

A Partition of Prussia

SIR: It is freely declared that Germany has no right to Alsace-Lorraine, nor Prussia any right to Posen, because these territories were annexed by force, against the will of their populations. Nationalists often claim the right of northern Schleswig to union with Denmark on the same ground. But, in truth, such reasoning vitiates the right of Prussia to the greater part of her dominions. Silesia, for instance, was torn from the Hapsburg empress with no regard to the wishes or nationality of its people. At Vienna in 1815 the conquerors punished their victims and rewarded their allies without caring what the peoples preferred, and bestowed upon Prussia the northern half of Saxony, and the Roman Catholic, Francophile, unassimilable territories of the Rhine and Westphalia, as well as Polish Posen. In 1866 not only did Bismarck forcibly possess Prussia of Schleswig-Holstein; he also seized Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and the free city of Frankfort. It was these annexations which gave Prussia the dominion of Germany, even as the similar annexation by her allies of Serbia and Wallachia would now give her that of all Europe. And only by the restoration of these violated

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lands (violated, for all that their population is German, as truly as were Polish, French or Danish lands) to their former rulers or to independence, can Prussia's hold upon Germany be permanently loosened.

It is already agreed among the Allies that the territory which Napoleon took from Prussia when he constituted the Grand Duchy of Warsaw must again be part of Poland. Why should not at the same time Lusatia be given back to Saxony? Why not make Silesia—not quite Prussianized even after 160 years of Prussian rule—an autonomous state of the Empire? And, above all, why not make such a state from Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine—from the recently seized Prussian territory west of the Elbe—Hanover, Westphalia, and the Rhineland? With the junkerdom of Brandenburg and old Prussia this country has no connection, no sympathy. It is the mining, the industrial, the commercial nucleus of Germany. Politically, it is divided between Socialism and the capitalistic imperialism of the National Liberals, and of course the Catholic Center is strong; but with the agricultural Conservatives of old Prussia it has only occasional, log-rolling fellowship. Napoleon wisely took from Prussia in 1807 the few, scattered lands she then held west of the Elbe. Now half her strength lies there, and it would be the wisest step toward perpetuating peace if the populations of those lands were given their free choice between continued subservience to Potsdam and an autonomy which might soon bring to them the leadership of the Empire. Their natural connection is up the rivers with South Germany, not across the rivers with Prussia. And if both Silesia and West Germany were separated from her, Prussia would be almost wholly a farm-country, without the means to maintain her distinctive militarism if other German States, her equals then, refused.

The city of Berlin is now a province by itself. It is thoroughly socialistic, wholly out of sympathy with old Prussia. It should be made a Free City of the Empire, like Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck. And of course proud old Frankfort should resume the independence she lost only fifty-one years ago.

The Prussias, East and West, Pomerania, and Brandenburg, the fortress of junkerdom, autocracy, and militarism, would remain—the most backward and the weakest of the greater German states. Such a partition, presupposing always, of course, the consent of the separated peoples, will guarantee, as nothing else but the overthrow of the Empire as such, which seems most improbable, could guarantee, the permanence of whatever peace the Allies may finally attain. Is it not worth offering, at least, to the peoples of the Rhineland, Westphalia, Hanover, Lusatia, and Silesia, as a proposition made, indeed, by their enemies, but entirely "up to them" to decide, in freedom, on its own merits?

SAMUEL A. ELIOT, JR.

Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Are We Republicans?

SIR: Your leading article of July 7th, Unity at Washington? by William Hard, appears to be of the kind best calculated to please the Kaiser's American admirers.

Let it be true or untrue that President Wilson is losing the confidence of the country—and I emphatically believe it is a falsehood—such writings can serve no useful purpose in our present circumstances. Even in a highclass "journal of opinion," which may perchance feel free at times to train its guns upon some point beyond the safe limits of established data, good taste, if not good patriotism, should draw the line, and draw it with unflinching firmness.

The President, in his flag-day speech, referred to those who have learned "wisdom." Is this great man, already burdened with innumerable cares, to be made the target of irresponsible innuendo? Has the political campaign of 1920 already opened, and are there those who, under the guise of presenting unbiased opinion, are really manipulating propaganda?

The New Republic, along with the other organs of "opinion" in the United States, will certainly be held to "strict accountability"—accountability to that vast mass-opinion which, after all, they often so little influence!

WM. Y. WARD, M.D.

Ivanhoe, Texas.

The Age of Woman

SIR: A rather lively controversy was launched by the tilt between the directors of the military census in New York City and the suffragists assisting in the registration. The director of the census suggested in a public statement that the confusion and incompetence of the work had been due to the manoeuvers of women who were unwilling to give their ages. A spirited suffragist replied that she had found more men than women who were reluctant to give their ages, doubtless because they were afraid of the militia laws. The sham battle which ensued was extensively reported by the daily press, ever generous with space and levity when the traditional frailties of women form the subject of discussion.

As a matter of fact, a glance at the Federal Census of 1910 would show that men withheld their ages more frequently than women even in those ante-bellum days. The population of the city, equally divided between the sexes, was classified by age, leaving a group of 5,196 males and 1,196 females of unknown ages.

Perhaps it was only human of the officials in this case to prefer superstition to fact and fond delusions to dry statistics. But the incident reminds one forcibly of Gorky's recent statement that the greatest need of democracy in Russia was science, more science. Perhaps that is one of the things that ail democracy in our country.

KATHARINE ANTHONY.

New York City.

VERSE

Release

(*Abdication of Constantine of Greece, June, 1917.*)

If the lost shades of Hades yearn and strain
Back to the sun; if the Elysian fields
Offer their light and asphodel in vain
To those who would be men—to-day death yields;
A groping warmth steals down the ways of fear,
A whispering joy—as if the wind had blown,
The living wind of earth, sun-sweet and near,
Across the river with its boat of stone.

As if a wind had come, and they had stirred,
Wan, listless shadows, to a magic thing,
And in that silence, down the chill dusk heard
Voices they knew, old names, or songs of Spring,
And lifting up grim heads, remembered still
A marble temple on a shining hill.

HORTENSE FLEXNER.

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At the Capitol

WHEN the Senate has voted, Saturday, on the food control bill to which it has given its time exclusively since the 18th of June, there will still remain a good share of legislating to be done before Mr. Hoover finally secures his powers of regulation and control. Not often will two less similar versions of the same bill have been sent to conference. The Senate has written new regulations for the control of market manipulation, juggled the House section for prohibition beyond recognition, provided new plans for administration, struck from the bill its provision for a civil service staff of employees, and added, at least by implication, control over cotton, wool, jute, sisal, steel and iron, hides and skins, lumber, lead and aluminum and its products.

The reliance upon the conference as a third legislative body, necessary in this case, is in fact a means which has had to be resorted to steadily throughout the present session of Congress. So great have been the discrepancies in the House and Senate versions of the more important war measures, that there has come to be accepted in both houses the notion that the conference is a place for the initiation of legislation rather than for its patching together. Mr. Adamson, for instance, expressing his idea of the simplest way of enacting emergency railway legislation, remarked that if the House would simply pass a measure of one sort or another "we could thrash out the matter in conference"; and Mr. Penrose, speaking of a difficult problem in the bonds issue bill, suggested: "Let it go to conference, anyhow, and we will fix it." Similarly, in the conscription bill, the House provided that pay for enlisted men should be $30 a month, the Senate fixed upon $29, and both houses agreed in identical terms as to the punishment for evasions from service. Yet the conferees set the soldier's pay, not at $30 or $29 or $29.50, but at $25; and where they had no differences to reconcile—wrote in a new penalty for the punishment of evasions.

With this predisposition on the part of conferees in Congress to initiate legislation, an obvious result of turning over to them two widely different versions of a bill is delay in its final approval. In the case of such measures as the conscription act there is not a great disadvantage in a delay of several weeks. But it is often different with a measure which carries an appropriation. The necessity of prompt action upon the first administration food measure, known as the food-survey bill, was supposed to be for the reason that it supplied the Department of Agriculture with funds imperatively needed to stimulate production before the season was too far gone. That was the assertion of the administration leaders in Congress, and the reason for their success. But, after six weeks, the bill carrying these indispensable sums is still in conference. In much the same way the amount of conference legislating that had to be done on the Urgent Deficiencies bill so held up necessary appropriations that war work encountered difficulties. Not only was there a pause in new plans, but the Secretary of War informed the House that unless funds of some sort were placed at his disposal, certain contractors who had made bona fide agreements with the government would be faced with immediate bankruptcy.

A more serious consideration than delay, however, even delay in a time of war, is the irresponsible and patchwork character of the legislation that comes from a conference which has had two very unlike bills to reconcile. The usual number of conferees is six—occasionally it is eight—and every circumstance contributes to this small group a maximum power and a minimum responsibility. A provision over which one house may have spent days in conscientious effort can conveniently be thrown overboard in conference, and the action justified solely with the explanation that the conferees of the other house were extraordinarily obstinate. There is irony in the fact that Congress maintains an unabridged record of the many dispensable debates upon its floors, but not even a memorandum of the arguments that lead to a final decision in conference. Though secrecy surrounds its proceedings it may be guessed, however, that a conference is not the place for delicate adjustment which it is theoretically designed to be; Mr. Gillett's description of his experience in conference on the War Appropriations bill is probably typical: "I made up my mind pretty soon that this proposition [the Jamestown purchase] was one that the Senate was determined upon. We held out and we haggled and bargained and traded . . . but we finally yielded."

For this state of affairs two routine practices of Congress are partly responsible. In the House there is a rule that no amendment may be attached to a pending measure unless it is "germane to the subject matter." But since the Senate has no such restriction, every unsatisfied wish of a member of the lower house, every afterthought of a Cabinet member, must be put into a bill when it is before the Senate. The dissimilarity in the rules manufactures work for the conferees—and more is added by the fashion in which an important piece of legislation is usually taken up. To make time in the handling of such matters as food control, separate bills are introduced simultaneously in both houses. But the result is often delay rather than dispatch; for when one version of the bill has been approved, it must be substituted for the version which the other house is debating—and the way is often opened for an iteration of the general comment on not necessarily relevant matters which is always given to a new bill. It is in an attempt to avoid this repetition that two wholly different bills are sometimes turned over to an irresponsible and perhaps prejudiced group of conferees.

But different from these routine causes of conference legislation, and more fundamental, is the fact that so far as war plans and developments go even the administration leaders in Congress are without any general and definite information. The evils of the conference result from having two widely different bills to adjust; but two widely different bills are only partly the result of incompetent leadership. The fact is that often a committee chairman on the floor will accept an amendment whose import is unsatisfactory to an executive office, or permit the deletion of a section regarded as indispensable, simply because his acquaintance with administration purposes is fragmentary. He is equipped so that he may answer in parrot fashion inquiries as to the matter immediately in hand; but he has not the information to judge of possible changes against a connected background, and his ideas of what a bill is intended to accomplish may differ seriously from those of the administration. The Senate Committee on Agriculture decided, for instance, that to carry out the purposes of the food survey bill the original estimate of $2,000,000 could stand being doubled—while the House committee, drawing an inference as to administration purposes from the same meagre information, thought that it might as well be cut in half. With the uncertain and artificial method Congress has of selecting its leaders, reluctance to place more than a minimum confidence in committee chairmen is not hard to understand.

C. M.

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Books and Things

DR. ROSS C. WHITMAN, professor of pathology in the University of Colorado, has sent The New Republic a letter which I hope he won't mind seeing here, instead of in our correspondence column. "Although," he writes, "I should have to confess that, having once been a teacher of Latin and Greek, I should to-day have difficulty in reading a page in either language without a dictionary under my elbow; and although, in my capacity as that member of our faculty usually charged with the melancholy duty of making answer to questionnaires, I have in the course of time acquired a profound and far-reaching distrust of the accuracy of any information obtained through the agency of these instruments of torture, I would gladly accept the challenge of P. L., published in your current issue, to submit the whole question of the permanent value of studying Latin and Greek to the test of a questionnaire, provided there is included a similar test as to some other subjects. Let us, for example, find out how many former students of mathematics, not now engaged in actual mathematical work, can bring the Pythagorean theorem to a victorious Q. E. D.; or how many former students of chemistry, not now actively engaged in chemical work, can give offhand the atomic weight of nitrogen; or how many former students of American history, in a like situation, can give the dates of the founding of any ten colonies on these shores; or how many students of domestic science can tell just why one uses soda rather than baking powder in gingerbread, or give an adequate account of the action of yeast in the making of bread. Similar tests will readily suggest themselves for other subjects, running the gamut from the most ancient and useless, to the most modern and practically useful. The result, I fancy, would prove something of a shock to the adherents to the doctrine that content determines the educational value of a subject.

"As for me, I am content with the notion that there are some values in life which are ephemeral by their very nature, and some other values that are by their very nature eternal; and that this permanent and eternal quality renders those objects possessing the same, classics by the terms of the definition. I am quite entirely satisfied in my own mind, that when we have once more learned that the 'imponderables' are the things most worth working hard to acquire, we shall have less of that T. B. M., mentioned on another page of the same issue, finding his summum bonum in ogling and evaluating nakedness at the show."

Such an inquiry as Dr. Whitman suggests would of course be many times more valuable to an educator than the one I gave the outlines of in this column. What I was talking about was only one corner of a large subject. Strategy for Latinists was my concern. I wanted them either to prove not that Latin is now taught in this country no worse than a lot of other things, but that it is taught so that many boys and girls do learn a good deal of Latin; or else to admit their dissatisfaction with the amount of Latin learned, and going on from this point to track their dissatisfaction into existing methods of teaching. I believe in a little Latin for almost everybody, and in more than college Latin—not more hours of Latin but more Latin—for the minority who show signs of a disposition to take a literary interest in literature. Dr. Whitman's letter convinces me that upon one point, at least, I made myself anything but clear, and therefore I repeat that the Latinists in this country are not putting their best champions forward, or else that their best champions are not good enough. My idea of a champion better than good enough is satisfied by Mr. J. W. Mackail. Nobody who reads his little book on Latin Literature can help suspecting that Mr. Mackail has drawn from Latin such particular aesthetic pleasures as he could have drawn from no other source. This suspicion would no doubt be conviction in any one who is in the habit of reading Latin. Mr. Mackail would be a different man, he would neither feel as he feels nor write as he writes, if he had not drunk so deep of Latin rivers and brooks.

A still different inquiry, unlike either the one Dr. Whitman proposes or the one that I proposed, might have interesting results. It would begin by assuming that Latin is as badly taught or as little learned as its enemies say. It would try to find the "average" Latin student, who would have to be above the average in candor and self-knowledge, and to induce him to tell what Latin had done to him. Or to her. For something, of course, is done to them. No one can pay attention to any subject for so many hours, for so many years, and be exactly what he would have been if he had brought the same degree of attention, for the same time, to bear upon a different subject. I have a friend whose Latin has left him, to my undiscerning eye, almost unmarked. But not quite. He is unwilling to use the word "dilapidate" when he is talking of a wooden building. Another friend is enabled by his Latin to be pleased when he finds in Mr. Max Beerbohm, the living author who best knows how to make Latin words do him whimsical service in English prose, such a phrase as "held their heads averse." Or upon finding in the same author, when he is describing Zuleika Dobson's progress from the railway station into the heart of Oxford, the statement that "not many youths occurred." But even traces so faint as these are not always easy to find. Each of us has acquaintances who seem to have resisted, with exemplary success, all the efforts of all their teachers to teach them anything at all.

Dr. Whitman's letter has tempted me to look back upon my education in school and at college, and to ask myself what I learned best. Three separate attempts were made, at home, at school, in a summer course at Harvard, to teach me the rudiments of botany. They all failed. To-day I remember a difference between calyx and corolla, and when I come across "cotyledon" I know it is a botanical word. Botany is my prize specimen, put forward whenever there is a chance to contrast what I learned with what I was taught. At the other end of the scale I believe I should put Latin, for such French or German as I know was learned mostly out of school hours. An examination in Latin, although it would reveal that I could neither write nor read the language, or do much with paradigms, would have results less humiliating than an examination in anything else. This conviction, formed after reading and thinking about Dr. Whitman's letter, was at first a surprise. It surprised me less when I remembered Mr. William Coe Collar, who was the best teacher I ever had in any subject I was capable of understanding, and who taught me Latin longer than anything else. He used to talk Latin to us, in our last years at school, and to seize upon chances of showing us how certain English poems were more fun to read if we knew something of the Latin background in the poet's mind. And once in a while he would say, when recommending a Latin author not included in the course, "Don't go at him as if you were studying him for me. Read him like gentlemen taking your ease."

P. L.

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The Fruit of Babel

The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe, by Leon Dominian. New York: Published for the American Geographical Society by Henry Holt & Co.

NINE Americans out of ten, if they think at all of the international reorganization that ought to follow this war, give a prominent place in their formulas to the principle of nationality. The political frontiers of a state should correspond with the frontiers of nationality, in so far as this is at all practicable. The exclusion from their natural political society of the French in Alsace-Lorraine, the Danes in Schleswig, the Italians, Serbs and Rumanians in Austria-Hungary has proved a lasting menace to the peace of Europe. The denial of the right of compact national groups like the Poles, Bohemians, Finns and Armenians to form autonomous political organizations, while perhaps less menacing to world peace, is even more abhorrent to democracy. The Italian in the Tyrol or the Frenchman in Alsace is sustained by the thought that across the border the genius of his race can find free expression. He can migrate if oppression rests too heavily upon him. The Bohemian, Pole or Armenian sees his nationality everywhere oppressed. If he wishes to escape personal disabilities he has to submit to denationalization.

But when this seductive principle is to be translated into concrete geographical details most of us find ourselves on quaking ground. Would the transfer of the whole of Alsace-Lorraine to France, of the whole of Trent and Istria to Italy accord with the principle of nationality? Could a Tchecho-Slovak state be constituted that would not itself include minority national groups, to excite international strife and thwart democratic development? It appears to be incumbent upon us to acquaint ourselves with the actual distribution of nationalities on European soil. The publication of Mr. Dominian's Frontiers of Language and Nationality thus supplies a pressing need. In any circumstances the appearance of this book would have been an event of importance to scholars since it is by far the most competent work on the subject available in English. Just now its practical value is so great that it ought not to become a scholar's monopoly.

Nationality frontiers must for the most part be determined by the language spoken by the majority. There are, to be sure, German-speaking Frenchmen and French-speaking Germans, Serbs who know only Italian, Greeks whose vernacular is Albanian. But the origin of a stock counts for little; humanity is racially an universal migma, anyway. A common language implies, as a rule, the common cultural values upon which stable political organization must be based.

Nationality frontiers, thus defined in terms of vernacular used, may be determined with a fair degree of accuracy in western Europe. Between France and Germany the language frontier would leave most of Alsace on the German side, but would transfer to France a wide strip of Lorraine, centering in Metz. Between Italy and Austria the language frontier would place the greater part of the Tyrol, but not all that the Italians claim, on the Italian side of the line. A small strip of the territory within the eastern Italian boundary is Slovene-speaking and might be claimed by a Jugo-Slav state on the basis of nationality. A fringe of Italian nationality, including Trieste, appears on the western coast of Istria.

As one might suppose, there is nothing like unanimity of opinion as to the precise location of these language frontiers; German authorities would place the line in Lorraine further west, and French authorities further east. Frontier populations are largely bilingual, and without great departure from honesty may be counted on either side. When we pass to southern and eastern Europe much more serious problems emerge. In Bohemia, there is a large fringe of German-speaking population on the northwest. There are also various German communities settled as enclaves in the midst of the Tchechish population. Hungary is well dotted over with German-speaking enclaves. Transylvania, Bukowina and Bessarabia are prevailingly Rumanian. But if all this territory were organized in a Rumanian state, it would include numerous islands, some of them very important, of Germans, Magyars, Bulgars and Turks. As for the other Balkan states and Asia Minor, nothing like definite language frontiers is determinable. Bosnia, Herzegovina and Croatia are quite clearly Serb-speaking, but in much of Croatia the nationality majority is small. In Macedonia, Bulgars, Serbs and Greeks present the most astoundingly overlapping claims. Mr. Dominian seems to adjudicate impartially, but even his conclusions have only a tentative value. In Asia Minor the Greeks have a clear claim to a coastal fringe on the west, and the greater part of the Anatolian plateau is the natural heritage of that secular detritus of peoples, Hittites, Phrygians, Lydians, Scythians, Celts, Mongols, etc., that we call Turks. In a triangle extending from Adana to the Russian and Persian boundaries the Armenians represent the most important element in the population, but scarcely anywhere a majority element.

Mr. Dominian is a believer in nationality as the proper basis of political organization. But one who follows his candid analysis will be oppressed with doubts. In northwestern Europe, where the endogenous growth of societies has been uninterrupted through centuries and the intrusion of foreign elements has not exceeded the social power of absorption, the national state, with a common language and a common culture, is practicable. South Russia, the Balkans, the Danube valley and Asia Minor have throughout history served principally as highways for racial migration. Each intruding race has left vestiges of itself in the form of communities clinging tenaciously to their traditional language and culture. The north European formula of the national state seems to apply very badly to these great regions of interpenetrating nationalities. The Roman Empire handled a similar problem by restricting narrowly the sphere of central government and exercising toleration not only to local institutions but to caste or clan or sect that withdrew itself from local control. Caesar contented himself with the things that were Cæsar's. The modern polychrome polyglot state must assume a wider range of functions if it is to hold its own against the true national states. The problem is difficult, but there is no reason why we should assume that it is impossible of solution. And if it were solved, what interesting cultural phenomena might emerge! Imagine all the nationalities of Asia Minor associating harmoniously in a commonwealth but each preserving its own special character.

There is enough of historical background in Mr. Dominian's book to afford an insight into the permanence of national frontiers. How long has the German-French language frontier occupied its present place? Very little shifting has occurred since the days of Louis XIV. In France and Belgium, French has encroached upon Flemish, but the stronger tongue has conquered only about eighty square miles since the thirteenth century. Serbian and

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Slovenian seem to have held their existing northwestern boundaries for over a thousand years. The Kutzo-Vlachs on the slopes of Pindus, though a very small fragment of the Rumanians, have resisted assimilation through hundreds of years. No doubt the merely residual national groups will tend to disappear under the influence of modern industrialism. But to produce homogeneity in any possible system of states in central and eastern Europe will be a work of centuries.

A. J.

Poetry and the Child

The Cambridge Book of Poetry for Children, edited by Kenneth Grahame. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

TO endow a nation with taste one would have to begin with the cradle and then hope for results in two or three generations. Certainly one of the most important things that can be done for a child is to let it listen to poetry from the very beginning of its career. It might be possible to make a very arguable thesis out of the statement that we are an inartistic nation because the American child for generations has been swamped in realism to the stultification of the imagination and in Puritanism to the frustration of all sensuous perceptions. No one will wish to deny that mathematics has been the chief concern of our public school system and that the popular books among children have been painfully realistic. Think of the tremendous vogue of the Louisa M. Alcott books and the army of her imitators! These books doubtless offered good ideals, freshness, vivacity and charm, but they would hardly take the place of an early intimacy with Froissart's Chronicles and Mallory's Morte D'Arthur.

England, more fortunate than any other European country in her great line of poets, has for centuries past trained her boys on the classics and this has led them by easy stages to Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, Shelley, Keats as reading matter rather than as an arduous school task. If we want a nation with taste, there is but one way—the way of fostering art interests from the cradle. Above all, the world poetry should be offered a child from the cradle days.

For this purpose the nursery itself must be furnished with good anthologies and thus far no perfect one has been made for very little children. Palgrave's Golden Treasury serves the second stage of childhood. This anthology can be offered an average child at the age of seven and it is a stand-by for life. From babyhood until seven the best anthology is still Whittier's Child-Life, although it ought now to be amplified from writers of genius who have appeared since it was published.

No one who knows Kenneth Grahame's Dream Days, The Golden Age, and The Wind in the Willows can doubt that the author was reared on the English poets and is himself a poet of parts and therefore ought to be the right person to make a new anthology for little children. His Cambridge Book of Poetry for Children is well divided into three sections—"For the very smallest ones," all of these might easily be absorbed by the time a child is five years old; "For those a little Older," the longest division and most useful for the next five years of a child's life; "For those still Older," a division that would hardly carry the child more than two years further.

If there is one general fault in the Cambridge Book of Poetry for Children it is that of underrating the child's intelligence. One can feel fairly sure that a poetry-loving child of ten would set the book aside for the younger children and turn to something fuller and richer, such as The Golden Treasury. The editor admits that his gleaning amounts to but a small sheaf, but adds that for those children who do not like poetry it will be enough, and for those who love it no selection will ever be adequate. Even so, fifty-four poems for children "still Older" seems a meagre allowance. There are omissions that make one gasp. Moreover, the editor has taken the liberty of cutting poems into pieces and giving bits, without any explanation of his omissions, so that children who already knew the poems would resent the omissions and children who later fell upon the complete poems, of which they knew only scraps, would resent their early misleading.

As to omissions, Mr. Grahame has a section devoted to Green Seas and Sailor Men, from which he has omitted Henry Newboldt's Fighting Temeraire and Admirals All. Three supreme poets for very little children, Robert Louis Stevenson, Christina Rosetti and Josephine Preston Peabody, are practically ignored; the last two entirely, while Robert Louis Stevenson has but one selection taken from his marvellous Child's Garden of Verse. On the other hand, there is more than enough of Eugene Field and Longfellow. Field's Contentment, with that horrid line, "The eggs eventuated bad," might well have been omitted, and the sentimental song, Mother and I, should have kept it company in exclusion. The writer did not, fortunately, include Longfellow's I Stood on the Bridge at Midnight, and Tell Me Not in Mournful Numbers, but he might likewise have left out A Dutch Picture. The poem chosen from Elizabeth Barrett Browning is one of her very worst, The Lost Bower, overflowing as it is with her usual bad rhymes, "daily" and "valley"; "closes" and "losses"; "hazels" and "dazzles"; "clenching" and "branching"; "run" and "anon"; "hushing" and "cushion"; "reed" and "head"; "laughing" and "half-in";—a long list even for a poem of thirty-three stanzas. If Mrs. Browning is to be represented surely that poignant lyric, The Musical Instrument, deserved to go in. William Allingham's

> "Up the airy mountain,
> Down the rushy glen
> We daren't go a hunting
> For fear of little men."

is appropriately included as well as almost all the loveliest child lyrics from Blake. Jean Ingelow's Echo and the Ferry are poor substitutes for the Songs of Seven, but right after these comes Wordsworth's Poor Susan's Dream, and the reader is appeased.

The author takes many liberties with titles, giving his own when it pleases him, so that Browning's poem Memorabilia appears as Something to Remember, and three couplets from Blake's Proverbs are given the title Three Things to Remember.

Among the unexpected poems are some lovely bits by W. B. Rand; a charming and little known verse by Amy Lowell; two by John Davidson that we have never before seen in Children's Anthologies; one very beautiful selection from Sydney Dobell, one by Norman Gale, one by H. M. Maugham. Of Ann and Jane Taylor there is altogether too much. Omissions occur that are annoying, among others the first two lines of the blessed Bridget's prayer—

> "God bless my hut from thatch to floor,
> The twelve Apostles guard my door,
> Matthew, Mark, Luke and John
> Guard the bed I lie upon."

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Probably the best introduction to any criticism of an anthology is to state that every one should be his own anthologist, and there could be no better training for a child than to teach him from the very beginning to collect his own favorite poems and make his own anthology.

The Cambridge Book of Poetry for Children is not so good as The Golden Treasury; it is more carefully and poetically chosen than Mrs. Kate Douglas Wiggins's Golden Numbers. It is for little children and suits about the same age as Whittier's Child-Life, though the last contains four or five times as many poems. Though it is natural to have hoped for better things from so able a writer as Kenneth Grahame, the book is still a good one for the average child to use until he is about ten years old, when, if he does not demand more and better poetry he will doubtless be doomed to increase that vast number of people who make up a nation without taste.

LOUISE COLLIER WILLCOX.

Padraic Colum

ALTHOUGH William Butler Yeats was the founder of the Irish Literary Theatre it is a significant fact that the influence of his personality on the movement was generative rather than formative. Out of the shadowy twilight that enfolded him he evolved poignant and perilously beautiful things, but practically the entire group of poets and dramatists that leaped so ambitiously to his side turned their faces another way and found in the steaming soil and struggles of the Irish peasantry their proper inspiration. No mystic twilight, full of the milk-white feet of faeries, shed its subdued glow on their work. It was rather a red sun that shone down. Mr. Yeats, unconsciously perhaps, suggested a personal movement in which the poet was a determinative moulder of theme and treatment, but the writers who followed him enlarged it into a national movement. Through this wise and logical course resulted the vitality of the Irish renaissance.

Leaving aside the names of Synge, A.E., Lady Gregory and Mr. Yeats, not one of the younger Irish writers is better known in America than Padraic Colum and he is the antithesis of the esoteric Yeats. While Mr. Yeats started in poetry and ended in drama Mr. Colum started in drama and has apparently ended in poetry. Now that several volumes of his work are accessible it is easy to see why this should be so. The genius of Mr. Colum is essentially a personal one and the sensations he experiences find their more lucid exposition in poetry. But at the same time he found in drama an instrument with which to present certain fundamental truths about Ireland.

When the Irish Literary Theatre was founded in the small obscure Antient Concert Rooms of Dublin in 1899 Edward Martyn saw the opportunity for "an idealism founded upon the ancient genius of the land." Padraic Colum saw an idealism extracted from the modern sorrow of the land and in his plays gave vital expression to it. Whether one reads The Fiddler's House, The Land or Thomas Muskerry one finds always a thesis put on some problem of Ireland. It is because Mr. Colum is so much more concerned with the situation than self-expression that so little of himself is found in the dramas as compared to his poetry. The family system, the question of the land, the revolt of the young against the fetters of environment are always the themes. There are but two ideas common to both poetry and plays and they are the wanderlust and the love of the soil.

Mr. Colum's The Land is described as "an agrarian comedy," but the comedy is sardonic and a sinister note runs through it. It was the purpose of the author to show the condition of modern Ireland and the characters in the play may be taken as types. The love of wandering, that great Irish trait, touched upon in all of Mr. Colum's plays, sounds a clear note and so, too, does the subtle arraignment of the family system hinted at in all the dramas. Murtagh Cosgar is a hard man, a man who has worked all his life for a home. Now that he has it under the Land acts of 1903 he is anxious to pass it on to the single son who has endured his hardness and remained by him. But the son loves Ellen and follows her to America, leaving to the dull and the weak the land so dearly bought. Even though his father's will is broken Matt Cosgar will not remain. It is the iconoclasm of youth implacably searching for idols of its own. The new generation will not be subservient to the old.

This new generation is again typified by Maire Hourican in The Fiddler's House. She goes back into the wandering life with her father because her strong-willed irascible lover frightens her into a realization of the impossibility of living with him. This woman of the new generation will not recognize the old system of the man-head of the family. Man and woman must meet on equal terms. Stronger than ever is sounded that second great motif of Mr. Colum in this play. The wanderlust calls to Conn Hourican, Maire's father, and he needs must crash his home down about him to be off again on the winding roads. So this play ends, too, with a departing, a breaking of old traditions.

"I'm leaving this house behind me," says Conn, "and maybe the time will come when I'll be climbing the hills and seeing the little house with tears in my eyes. I'm leaving the land behind me, too; but what's land after all against the music that comes from the far, strange places, when the night is on the ground, and the bird in the grass is quiet?"

Here we have a larger utterance, a cadenced speech bringing memories of Synge which Mr. Colum all too seldom achieves in his plays. He has trouble with his dialogue and at times it is inert, a heavy language, wingless and commonplace. Can it be that the situation engrosses him at the expense of the language?

Poetry but seldom rises to the surface in it and the few times when it does emerge shine gloriously in contrast with the rest. Least of all is there poetry in The Land and most of all is that play one concerned primarily with situation, and a national problem. There is poetry in The Fiddler's House. Many of the speeches of the fiddler seem but expressions of Mr. Colum himself. The more personally he writes the more poetical he becomes, although there is one notable exception. In Thomas Muskerry there is a death scene where the delicately evasive and spare hand of tragedy lifts the action to a rarified plane.

This play brings to mind certain moods of the Russian writers. It is tragedy but strangely tender tragedy. The conflict is not violent but measured. Thomas Muskerry, who for thirty years has been Master of the Workhouse, finds age upon him and his family waiting eagerly for his dismissal. Such is the irony of Fate that he dies an inmate of the place where once he ruled. The last scene of Thomas Muskerry's death in the pauper-bed is the best thing that Mr. Colum has done in the three plays. The book is closed in silence.

When a writer is more interested in situation, especially situations built upon national problems, than upon personal characterization, one looks for answers and remedies.

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Strange to say Mr. Colum offers none. A certain symbolism may be read into his work, his characters personify certain attributes of Ireland, but no questions are answered. Several are asked.

This detached attitude is a familiar one of Mr. Colum's. In some of the poems, genre pictures full of actuality, it comes to the surface and there is a certain strength in it. But there is greater strength in the expression of personality found in the poems. The oft reiterated wanderlust is perhaps the strongest link between the plays and the poems if the basic foundation of both, the soil, be mutely accepted. Even that last tragic scene in Thomas Muskerry ends to the clear notes of the distant pipes of Myles Gorman tramping the highway.

This wandering note is obviously a personal expression. Padraic Colum is a wanderer at heart for only to such could the highways call so sweetly. Earth cries in his poetry. There he is allowed the opportunities that his plays could not give. Not even in Mogu the Wanderer, a drama that impresses itself upon one as an anomaly, could he find himself. Indeed, this play, from which it cannot be doubted Edward Knoblauch received inspiration for Kismet, is totally removed from the trend of Mr. Colum's style. It sparkles now and then with a Dunsany-like phantasy, but that is all.

It is in the poetry, in its dark-tinted magic, that the true man, the lover of the soil is found. Soil underlies it and grey Irish skies droop over it. Pools glimmer like opals in brown-peat fields and the voices of birds are sharp on the road. The color of the middle counties, Meath, Leitrim and Longford, is cast across it.

The opening poem in his book, The Plougher, is significant.

"Sunset and silence! A man: around him earth savage,
earth broken;
Beside him two horses—a plough!"

The dawn-man is described standing out like a Rembrandt figure. Padraic Colum is a dawn-man; he is a plougher. He is youth, unconstrained, furrowing up the soil of life. He is a driver of cattle through "brown bogs and black water" with his thoughts ever as he drives on "The King o' Spain's daughter." He is earth animated with a soul. He will go away from "the net of the cruel town"; he will find Ireland in the faces of peasants; in their dim eyes will he find truth.

Padraic Colum does not touch the Irish peasant tentatively. He comes close to him and fondles him with both hands. In the plays this is true and part of their strength. In such poems as A Drover, What the Shuiler Said, Polonius and the Ballad Singers, Girls Spinning, A Poor Scholar of the Fourties, and especially Poor Men Complaining, he comes into direct contact with the heart of Ireland. He does not wander in pearl-grey ways of mysticism; neither does he soar into the crystal vault where fades "the old blue flower of day," but he walks on the brown bog where the old men complain of their thankless kin, on the byways where the girls spin and dream of love, in the lanes where the ballad singers bring ancient songs into the sunlight.

To take life and present it objectively requires a restrained talent. Padraic Colum does this. He captures a spirit, a vivid semblance, and lays it before the reader. It is not of interest to him what you make of it. At least he shows no sign of attempting to teach.

He says, "A song is more lasting than the voice of the birds!" For this reason he sings.

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HERBERT S. GORMAN.

The War Pettified

Carry On: Letters in Wartime, by Lieutenant Coningsby Dawson. New York: John Lane Company. $1.00.

ONE wishes fervently while reading these letters of Lieutenant Dawson's that instead of having just begun the career of a popular novelist before his departure for the trenches he had been one of "that mob of broken counter-jumpers, ragged ex-plumbers and quite unheroic persons" of whom he speaks so enthusiastically. For Lieutenant Dawson himself is quite consciously not unheroic. He is eternally aware of the historic splendor of his mission, he savors keenly and lyrically the emotion of one who may be called upon at any moment to make "the final sacrifice." Scarcely a letter passes without some reference to that; evidently the thought of dying titillates his sensibilities with a pleasant melancholy. "Whatever happens I know that you will be glad to remember that at a great crisis I tried to play the man, however small my qualifications. . . ." Again: "Life has become so stern and

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scarlet—and so brave. If I have to 'go West' I shall do so proudly and quietly. . . . Poor little circle of three loving persons please be tremendously brave. We've all got to be worthy of each other's sacrifice." Again: "It's all rather a lark, but a lark which may turn against you at any time." Lieutenant Dawson never lets his poor parents forget that sinister possibility. Nineteen-year-old Hugh Britling's letter are mercifully free from this sort of thing. Always are we made to feel that Lieutenant Dawson is the soldier on dress parade; even the filthy clothing he describes is no more, one cannot help feeling, than a vesture displayed with ever so tiny a hint of complacency—the small boy showing off. To this craving of the adolescent to focus attention Lieutenant Dawson confesses with a pretty naïveté: "My dear father, I'm over thirty and yet just as much a little boy as ever. . . . I'm glad that there are black days when you have no letters from me. I love to think of the rush to the door when the postman rings and the excited shouting up the stairs, 'Quick, one from Con'."

In these letters the war becomes a petty and unmeaning thing since it cannot pierce the tough film of the writer's self-consciousness. It is at best no more than testimony to Lieutenant Dawson's induration in this regard. What contributes most strongly to this impression is the fact that Lieutenant Dawson allows himself to think of the great struggle as "copy" for future novels, as a vestibule to a snug literary future. Never is he carried away in an onrush of rebelliousness against the hideousness and cruelty of war. Never is he assailed by doubt. There is in these letters no vividness, no nakedness, no passion. They are the letters of the hero of a novel to a doting sweetheart. The war has already given us too many real documents to make this one tolerable. After the unforgetable death of Private Jewell that Hugh Britling describes, after the searing torture of Le Feu by Henri Barbusse, after the spiritual torment of Hugh de Sélincourt's A Soldier of Life, Lieutenant Dawson seems posturing in a rose-colored spotlight.

Contributors

to this issue

NORMAN ANGELL is the author of The Great Illusion and other books on international relations. He spent his youth in the western United States, has been in newspaper work both in this country and in England, was general manager of the Paris Daily Mail, 1905-1914.

ELIZABETH SHEPLEY SERGEANT is a graduate of Bryn Mawr College, has lived in France, and is the author of French Perspectives.

L. PEARSALL SMITH is an English writer, the author of The English Language, in the Home University Library.

LOUISE COLLIER WILLCOX has been an editorial writer on Harper's Weekly, Harper's Bazar, and the North American Review. She is the author of The Human Way and The Road to Joy.

HERBERT S. GORMAN is on the staff of the Springfield (Massachusetts) Union.

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Address: **Alexander Jessup, 500 Fifth Ave., New York City**

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